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INTRODUCTION

The internet is increasingly fragmented. In the summer of 2020,
when then President Trump decided to block Chinese apps TikTok and
WeChat by executive orders,' the New York Times warned that the Trump
Administration's hardline policy on China "may split the web." 2 This
warning echoes what former Google CEO Eric Schmidt was quoted as
saying in September 2018-that in the next ten to fifteen years, the internet
would most likely be split into two with one led by China and one led by
the United States.3 The Biden Administration repealed some measures
taken by Trump,) but has not changed the fundamentally aggressive policy
towards China. China did not merely remain on the defensive. In 2021,
two major pieces of legislation on cyberspace were passed-the Data
Security Law (DSL), and the Personal Information Protection Law
(PIPL). 6 These legislations reflected and consolidated a general

s

Two executive orders were issued by President Trump in August 2020: Exec. Order No. 13,942,
85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020) (relating to the TikTok app) and Exec. Order No. 13,943, 85
Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020) (relating to WeChat). The executive order was quickly
challenged, however, and a federal district court in California issued a nationwide injunction
against implementation. See WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal.
2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (granting plaintiffs preliminary
injunctive relief against implementation of Executive Order 13,943). On June 9, 2021, the Biden
Administration revoked the ban on TikTok and WeChat. John D. McKinnon & Alex Leary, Biden
Revokes Bid to Ban TikTok, WeChat, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2021, at Al.
Ana Swanson, Paul Mozur & Raymond Zhong, U.S. HardLine on China Tech May Split Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2020, at Al.
Editorial, As Internet Splinters, the World Suffers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2018, at A22.

a

See Dan Strumpf, Pentagon PullsXiaomi off Sanctions List, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2021, at B4.

2

5 See Bob Davis, U.S. Eyes Tech Alliance Against China, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2021, at A2.
6 ZhonghuaRenmin Gongheguo Shuju AnquanFa (+$A
tAhF W jg It 4) [Data Security Law
of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
June 10, 2021, effective Sept. 1, 2021), STANDING. COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 951
(2021); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa (+4 A M91 tA tp;
[Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 20, 2021, effective Nov. 1, 2021), STANDING COMM.
NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 1117 (2021).
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framework characterized by data localization requirements and
governmental scrutiny.
A split on the internet is happening across the Atlantic as well. In
July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in
Schrems II that the United States did not provide an adequate level of
personal data protection. 7 The U.S.-EU divide over online data privacy,
exacerbated in 2013 by Edward Snowden," is now back to its starting
point. 9 In December 2020, the EU publicized two major proposed
legislations on the internet: the Digital Markets Act and the Digital
Services Act.' 0 The first regulates the behavior and policy of large digital
platforms (the "gatekeepers") in creating contestable procedure and fair
market conditions for small businesses; the second is focused on digital
service providers and a new supervisory mechanism for creating a
transparent and safe environment. These laws, considered by the Wall
Street Journal to be the "most ambitious internet laws since the GDPR

Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm'rv. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July
16, 2020). This case followed Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r (Schrems I),
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015). Between the two cases, a major legal framework on privacy
was updated in the EU. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 0.J. (L 119). Following the CJEU's decision in
Schrems II, the Irish Data Protection Commission commenced an inquiry to consider whether the
actions of Facebook Ireland's transfer of personal data relating to individuals in the European
Union was lawful, but that inquiry was challenged by Facebook Ireland in Irish High Court,
leading to a judgment on May 14, 2021. Facebook Ir. Ltd. v. Data Prot. Comm'n [2021] IEHC 336
(Ir.). The issues raised by Facebook Ireland were procedural, but it looks like the dispute is far
from over.
8

See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE

U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (1st ed. 2014) (describing data privacy in the wake of Edward
Snowden's revelations).
9 See generally Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy
Collision]; Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, TransatlanticDataPrivacy Law, 106 GEO.
L.J. 115 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz & Peifer]. See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving
ConflictingInternationalDataPrivacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2000)
(showing the difference between the EU and the U.S. in the early 2000s).
1

Commission Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Contestable and FairMarkets in the DigitalSector (DigitalMarkets Act), COM (2020) 842 final
(Dec. 15, 2020); Commission Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the
Council on a Single Marketfor DigitalServices (DigitalServices Act) and Amending Directive

2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
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[General Data Protection Regulation],"" if passed as proposed, would
significantly change the regulatory landscape.
Despite their fundamental differences, both the EU and China
frame their cyber law and policy in terms of "sovereignty." In China,
President Xi Jinping started talking about "cyber sovereignty" in 2015.12
The term "cyber sovereignty," vague as it is, is used to justify political
control of the internet and to create a protected space for domestic
industry.13 The EU also found the notion attractive but formulated it
slightly differently, calling it "digital sovereignty." In a brief to the
European Parliament in February 2020, digital sovereignty was defined as
"Europe's ability to act independently in the digital world."' 4 It seems
clear what brought China and the EU together in asserting "sovereignty"
in cyberspace is that they both feel the need to reclaim the power to control
and regulate the internet.
In the United States, however, the same word "sovereignty" was
used in the early 1990s by internet visionaries to mean the opposite-they
have imagined a world free from government regulations, with the internet
itself constituting a utopia characterized by self-governance. " Over the

"

12

13

Sam Schechner, Tech GiantsFace New Rules in Europe, Backed by Huge Fines, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
16, 2020, 7:48 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-face-new-rules-in-europe-backedby-huge-fines-11608046500 [https://perma.cc/AA67-3MQX].
China Allows no Compromise on Cyberspace Sovereignty, Renmin Ribao (h5 UttM) [PEOPLE'S
DAILY] (Dec. 17, 2015, 7:20 AM). http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1217/c90000-8991532.html#
[https://perma.cc/7E5N-PUCU] (last visited Sept. 25, 2021). Anqi Wang, Cyber Sovereignty at its
Boldest A Chinese Perspective, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 395, 397 (2020). See generally Wangluo
Zhuquan: Lilun yu Shijian (xW ttR: Uit-A)[Cyber Sovereignty: Theory and Practice] Oct.
21,
2019,
https://2019.wicwuzhen.cn/webl9/release/201910/t20191021_11229796.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2Q6P-W3QW] (last visited May 30, 2021).
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW CHINESE STATE

55-90 (1st ed. 2018).
"4 Tambiama Madeiga (Eur. Parliamentary Rsch. Serv. Ideas Paper), DigitalSovereignty for Europe,
at 1, PE 651.992 (July 2020). See also Jonathan Hackenbroich, Reality Bytes Europe's Bid for
Digital Sovereignty,
EUR.
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.
(Oct.
17,
2018),

15

https://ecfr.eu/article/commentaryreality_ byteseuropes bid for digital sovereignty/
[https://perma.cc/SV2Y-7YTH] (explaining the tools Europe has to influence and control the
internet in an American- and Chinese-dominated digital world).
See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (discussing internet regulations during the 1990s); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government

Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism,

12

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413 (1997) (advocating that self-governance of the Internet is desirable and
legally feasible); Joanna Zakalik, Law Without Borders in Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 101
(1996) (arguing against internet regulations); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE
L.J. 1743 (1995) (discussing the path to regulating the internet). Compare Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty-Thoughtson the Internet's Role in Strengthening Nationaland

&
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years, this belief became weaker,1 6 but the association of internet with
freedom remained unshaken-in 2012, the Arab Spring was hailed as the
"Facebook Revolution" in the United States. "7 It was not until the
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal, revealed in 2018,18 that social
media began to be perceived as a major threat to democracy because it
allowed a foreign actor (Russia) to influence U.S. elections. In her recent
book, The Revolution That Wasn 't, sociologist Jen Schradie explains how
conservative groups used social media more effectively in their political
mobilization.1 9 Shoshana Zuboff, a professor from the Harvard Business
School, characterizes contemporary digital economy as "surveillance
capitalism," where "every casual search, like, and click was claimed as an
asset to be tracked, parsed, and monetized by some company. ..."20 This
"new breed of economic power," according to Zuboff, forcefully seduces
every trusting consumer into its powerful vortex: "the precise moment at

Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 423, 434 (1998) (explaining how the internet
could engage in self-governance), with Saskia Sassen, On the Internet and Sovereignty, 5 IND. J.
GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 545 (1998) (responding to other arguments on internet sovereignty). But see
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996); Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Internet and the Abiding Significance of TerritorialSovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD.
475 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119 (1998); Timothy
S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the InternationalSystem, 10 HARV. J.L.
TECH. 647 (1997); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A

BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).
6 Lawrence Lessig observed in 2006, "[i]n the years since [1999], that common view has faded. The

confidence of the internet exceptionalists has waned. The idea-and even the desire-that the
internet would remain unregulated is gone." LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at ix (2d ed.

2006).
17

See Jose Antonio Vargas, Spring Awakening How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook,

N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-anegyptian-revolution-began-on-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/6R26-GZ84]; Anupam Chander,
Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505 (2012). But see Marc Lynch, After Egypt
The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the AuthoritarianArab State, 9 PERSP. ON POL.
301, 302 (2011) ("For all their dizzyingly effective use by creative young activists, it is not obvious

that these new media exclusively challenge the competencies of authoritarian states.").
18 Nicholas Confessore, CambridgeAnalytica and Facebook The Scandal and the FalloutSo Far,

N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analyticascandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/AH58-KG5N]. Two of the Cambridge Analytica
whistleblowers, Chris Wylie and Brittany Kaiser, have published their memoirs on the events. See
BRITTANY KAISER, TARGETED: THE CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA WHISTLEBLOWER'S INSIDE STORY
OF HOW BIG DATA, TRUMP, AND FACEBOOK BROKE DEMOCRACY AND HOW IT CAN HAPPEN
AGAIN (1st ed. 2019); CHRISTOPHER WYLIE, MINDF*CK: CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA AND THE PLOT

TO BREAK AMERICA (1st ed. 2019).
19 See generally JEN SCHRADIE, THE REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T: HOW DIGITAL ACTIVISM FAVORS

CONSERVATIVES (2019) (arguing that conservative groups use social media more effectively in
political mobilization).
20

SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN NATURE

AT THE NEW FRONT OF POWER 52 (1st ed. 2019).
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which our needs are met is also the precise moment at which our lives are
plundered for behavioral data, and all for the sake of others' gain. "21
Zuboff warns, cyberspace is no different from the physical world: "[i]n
our enthusiasm and growing dependency on technology, we tended to
forget that the same forces of capital from which we had fled in the 'real'
world were rapidly claiming ownership of the wider digital sphere." 22
This significant shift in the perception of social media, and the
internet in general, calls for a more engaging understanding of the
regulatory concerns of global society and its regulatory division. 23 This
Article aims to develop such a global perspective. It is based on a
taxonomy of the digital world which is divided into three camps. The first
camp is the United States as the global center of the internet-home to
global digital platforms such as Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Amazon,
and Twitter, etc. The global center has commercial, strategic, and
ideological interests in keeping the internet an autonomous, self-contained
system that enables a free flow of data on the global level. The second
camp includes major data consumption countries-the Commonwealth
countries (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, etc.), the European Union, and
Japan. These are developed economies based on modern technology,
before the internet era, who now lag behind after the "lost decades."2 4 The
open nature of their economies and their political alliances with the United
States makes them ideal consumers in the digital economy. However,

2
22

Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 47.

23 In the United States, the Biden Administration appointed a number of experts
critical of Big Tech,

suggesting that the administration will be more serious in enforcing antitrust laws in America.
Cecilia Kang, A Leading Critic ofBig Tech WillJoin the White House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/technology/tim-wu-white-house.html
[https://perma.cc/4722-ENJ6]; David McCabe & Cecilia Kang, Biden Names Lina Khan, a BigTech

Critic,

as

F.T.C.

Chair,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

15,

2021),

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/technology/lina-khan-ftc.html
[https://perma.cc/N3JMHTPC]; Ryan Tracy & Aruna Viswanatha, Biden to NominateJonathanKanter as ChiefofJustice
Department's

Antitrust

Division,

WALL.

ST.

I.

(July

20,

2021),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/j onathan-kanter-to-be-nominated-as-doj-antitrust-chief-whitehouse-says-11626805273 [https://perma.cc/K2BX-6JKV].
24 In Japan, it is widely believed that the "late digitalization" was the main reason behind Japan's
stagnation. See Shosansei, Nihon wa Ressei Tsudzuku - Dejitaru-ka Okure Eikyo Ka [Productivity
Continues to be Inferior in Japan Widening Gap with the Average of Developed Countries],
JAPANESE
ECON.
NEWS
(Mar.
23,
2020),

https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO57082100SOA320C2NN1000/ [https://perma.cc/SB55YXJ8]. In 2019, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an
agency of the United Nations, reported that measured by market capitalization of major digital
platforms, Europe's share was only 4 percent. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., DIGITAL ECONOMY
REP. 2019, at xvi (2019).
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these countries are concerned about losing their competitive edge in the
digital economy or even control in modern social life; 25 they tend to treat
the internet as a global institution with suspicion. Their liberal
democracies give them strong instincts and their sophisticated legal
frameworks provide tools to regulate the behavior of the global digital
platforms, most of which are based in Silicon Valley. This second camp
tends to adopt legal rules from the perspective of the consumer.
The third camp is China, which considers itself an ideological and
technological rival to the United States. Its initial efforts to split the
internet-when it kicked Google out of the Chinese market and built the
"Great Firewall" (China's online censorship system)-were to defend and
preserve its political regime. 26 Today, China's e-commerce market is
worth $2 trillion, more than America's and Europe's combined.27 Tencent,
Alibaba, and Baidu became major digital platforms, and Huawei and ZTE
became major manufacturers in China's digital economy. 28 Like the
second camp, China has its own concerns. On the one hand, the regime is
heavily dependent on the tech firms for its global strategy and ambition,
as well as for their capacity and data for domestic control. 29 On the other
hand, however, these tech firms are all "private" enterprises and thus must

25

See Valentina Romei, EUFacesLong RoadAhead as it Tries to Catch DigitalLeaders in US and

China, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2019, at 3. In Japan, for example, Nippon Keizai Shimbun, a major
national newspaper, warned of the ongoing revolution of global economy based on "invisible
assets." Miezaru Shisan, Seicho No Minamoto Ni [Invisible Assets Become Source of Growth],
Nihonkeizaishinbun
[JAPANESE
ECON.
NEWS]
(Feb.
25,
2019),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZ041629950S9A220CISHA000/
[https://perma.cc/K9PQ-WG64]. For a broad analysis of Japan's tech sectors, see generallyMARIE
ANCHORDOGUY, REPROGRAMMING JAPAN: THE HIGH TECH CRISIS UNDER COMMUNITARIAN

CAPITALISM (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Cornell Univ. Press 2005).
26 ECONOMY, supra note 13; See generally JAMES GRIFFITHS, THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA:
HOW TO BUILD AND CONTROL AN ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF THE INTERNET (1st

ed.

2019);

Haiping Zheng, Regulating the Internet China'sLaw and Practice,4 BEIJING L. REV. 37 (2013).

Prior to the Golden Shield Program, online activism was already posing a challenge to the Chinese
Regime. See GUOBIN YANG, THE POWER OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA: CITIZEN ACTIVISM ONLINE

(1st ed. 2009).
27
28

The Future of Global E-Commerce, THE ECONOMIST., Jan. 2, 2021, at 10.
UNCTAD noted that "[t]he economic geography of the digital economy does not display a
traditional North-South divide. It is consistently being led by one developed and one developing
country: the United States and China." U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 24, at xvi. See
generally Ludwig Siegele, SpecialReport The DataEconomy, THE ECONOMIST. (Feb. 20, 2020),

https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020-02-22 [https://perma.cc/3K9R-GDE7].
29

See Jing Yang, Beijing Tracks Dissent over UbiquitousApp, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2020, at A8.

8
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be brought under control by the Party State. 30 For this reason, China also
treats the internet with suspicion and uses policy to regulate it.
This Article argues that the second and third camps not only share
a common interest in reclaiming sovereignty in cyberspace based on their
regulatory needs, but also, in the recent past, have aggressively adopted
similar regulatory policies in filling the vacuum in cyberspace. Together,
they took different legal positions from the U.S. and developed their own
legal rules: their courts increasingly claim rather than decline jurisdiction
over nonresident digital platforms; they have all adopted tort standards in
deciding liability rather than offering a broad immunity; and furthermore,
their courts are more open to using global injunction orders as remedy
against digital platforms who are innocent non-parties in disputes. All of
these actions by the second and third camps have resulted in what I have
termed a revolt against the U.S. hegemony in cyberspace.
This Article contributes to our understanding of the current state
of cyber law. The global perspective demonstrates an almost uniform
response to the U.S. law in cyberspace from all of America's major trading
partners. In the past, comparative studies tended to focus on a single
jurisdiction-typically, the European Union-and compared it with the
United States. This approach, informative as it was, significantly
understated the gravity of the differences between that jurisdiction and the
United States. Fundamentally, it was based on an American-centric
outlook with primary interests in building convergence models. 3' In
cyberspace, however, this is simply not helpful. 32 In recent years, scholars

s Lingling Wei, To Curb Ma's Empire, China Weighs Taking a Bigger Stake, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30,
2020, at Al. On the founding of Alibaba, see generally DUNCAN CLARK, ALIBABA: THE HOUSE
THAT JACK MA BUILT (1st ed. 2016). However, since 2017, the Chinese government has started

trying to control big tech in China. See Raymond Zhong & Sui-Lee Wee, China Seeks Small Stakes
in Online Companies, and More Power Over Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2017, at B3. See

generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership State Capitalism and the
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015) (discussing the control of private firms in China).
" See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191
(2003) (discussing global shifts in transnational litigation); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000) (examining constitutional cross-fertilization);
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (1st ed. 2004).
32
Anne-Marie Slaughter's network theory was initially followed by Paul M. Schwartz in his earlier
analysis of EU-US efforts on privacy before the GDPR. See Schwartz, The EU-U.C. Privacy
Collision, supra note 9, at 1967. However, Professor Schwartz's narrative for post-GDPR EUU.S. relationship has shifted. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 9 (contrasting the "rights talk" at
EU and the "marketplace discourse" in the United States). See generallyPaul M. Schwartz, Global
DataPrivacy The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771 (2019) (examining the regulatory environment
of international data protection) [hereinafter Schwartz, GlobalDataPrivacy].
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of the European Union have argued for the "Brussels effect," 33 which
contended that EU's more strict regulatory approach in cyberspace not
only persists but is now followed by many countries outside Europe. The
global perspective adopted in this Article follows the direction of the
regulatory theories and pushes the logic to its end. By examining cases
from five jurisdictions, this Article demonstrates not only that there is
divergence in cyberspace regulation but that the United States is a lone
outlier in its regulatory approach to the internet, while the other four
jurisdictions-the European Union, the Commonwealth countries, Japan,
and China-have all adopted a more rigorous regulatory approach. It is a
revolt.
In the remainder of this Article, Part I lays the foundation for the
comparison by describing the legal frameworks in the United States. It
tracks the development of legal doctrines in two critical areas. First, this
Article examines personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in
defamation and intellectual property cases. Second, it analyzes the
jurisprudence of Section 230 of Communications Decency Act (CDA), 34
which provides immunity to digital platforms. Part II then provides a
comparison of personal jurisdiction issues in laws and judicial cases in
four jurisdictions: the Commonwealth countries, the European Union,
Japan, and China. In contrast with the more limited personal jurisdiction
doctrines in the United States, the other four jurisdictions made it easier
for victims to establish personal jurisdiction and thus have access to courts.
Part III tracks legal doctrines on liability of digital platforms in the four
jurisdictions. In contrast with the general immunity in the United States
under Section 230 of the CDA, all four jurisdictions adopted tort liability
for digital platforms. Part IV tracks legal doctrines in global injunctions
by courts in the four jurisdictions to show a general move toward more
willingness to extend remedy beyond their borders. The global revolt in
cyberspace described in this Article is a significant development in the
twenty-first century, with critical policy ramifications. Some final
thoughts will be discussed in the conclusion.

" Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (2012) (discussing Europe's
"unilateralpower to regulate global markets" as tending to penetrate and influence other countries
to adopt similar measures). See also Schwartz, Global Data Privacy, supra note 32, at 771
(noticing EU's GDPR is widely regarded as a privacy law not just for the EU but for the world).
4 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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I. CYBERSPACE ACCORDING TO U.S. LAW

As the birthplace of the internet and home to global digital
platforms such as Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Amazon, the
United States potentially has a central role in regulating the internet.
However, the American regulations are built on a strikingly
counterintuitive principle: self-regulation. This is reflected in two areas of
law regulating cyberspace. The first area is personal jurisdiction, which is
procedural law that determines whether the digital platforms are within the
reach of courts. In cyberspace, power is highly concentrated in a small
number of digital platforms that are not in the same jurisdiction as the vast
majority of the hundreds of millions of users around the world. They are
typically not the perpetrator who wrote the defamatory statement or posted
the video in violation of copyright law. In other words, they are nonresident, third-party defendants.
In the United States, in order to assert personal jurisdiction, a
plaintiff is required to establish "minimum contacts" under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and state law. 35 While the
United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue since the arrival
of the internet, 36 lower federal courts and state courts often require a more
demanding "minimum contacts," making the court less accessible. The
second area of law is Section 230 of the CDA,37 a federal statute granting
general immunity to digital platforms and service providers from civil
liability. As will be discussed in detail, federal courts largely follow a
"bright-line rule" approach in interpreting Section 230 as a broad

3

See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.

36

See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to

PersonalJurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 473 (2004) (analyzing jurisdiction questions in a series
of internet-related cases). This is at odds with repeated reflections of the Supreme Court that
jurisdictional issues were driven by the commercial and technological transformation of the
American economy. In 1979, Justice White noted that "[t]he limits imposed on state jurisdiction
by the Due Process Clause, in its role as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation, have been
substantially relaxed over the years ... this trend is largely attributable to a fundamental
transformation in the American economy." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 293 (1980). Similarly, Justice Black once commented, "[l]ooking back over this long history
of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years." McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
37 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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immunity based on the distinction between "publisher" and "distributor.""
These two areas serve a common goal: self-regulation.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR JURISDICTION

Before the arrival of the internet, personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant had moved from strict territoriality to a more
flexible "minimum contacts" theory under the Due Process Clause. 39 In
the seminal decision InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, the United
States Supreme Court declared that "in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance ofthe suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'40 The question, however, is how to define "minimum
contacts." 4 On March 20, 1984, the United States Supreme Court
delivered opinions for two libel cases, both written by Justice Rehnquist.
So far, these are the ultimate guide for U.S. tort cases in the internet age.

8
39

See discussion infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945), overruling Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1878). The United States Supreme Court later ruled that state courts must follow International
Shoe standards when asserting in rem jurisdiction as well, thus concluding the transition from
territoriality in Pennoyer to the "minimum contacts" standards in InternationalShoe. See Shaffer

v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1978).
40 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted).
41 Many commentators have argued the United States Supreme Court has not clarified the issue in a
string of cases. See Hansonv. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("When a corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state' . . . it has clear notice that it is subject to
suit there...."); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) ("Where a forum
seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit
there, this lfair warning' requirement is satisfied if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his
activities at residents of the forum ... "); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 112 (1987) ("The 'substantial connection,' between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State. The placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State."); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886-87 (2011). See generally
Henry S. Noyes, The PersistentProblem of Purposeful Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41 (2012)

(discussing the recurring question of defining purposeful availment and proposing a definition). In
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1786 (2017), the question of purposeful

availment was not in dispute, but the court analyzed jurisdiction at length.
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1. Keeton and Calder
The Court developed the doctrine called "purposeful availment"
in the case Keeton v. Hustler Magazine.42 Here, a resident of New York
brought a libel suit in New Hampshire state court against an Ohio
publisher whose principal place of business was in California. On
minimum contacts, the Court stated that
the contacts between respondent and New Hampshire must be such
that it is "fair" to compel respondent to defend a multistate lawsuit in
New Hampshire seeking nationwide damages for all copies of the five
issues in question, even though only a small portion of those copies
were distributed in New Hampshire. 43

The Court found the publisher's regular circulation of its magazines
sufficient to support personal jurisdiction: "Where, as in this case,
respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has continuously and deliberately
exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being
hauled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its
magazine." 44
In Calder v. Jones,45 however, a unanimous Court adapted the
purposeful availment doctrine to intentional tort cases. Here, the plaintiff
was a California resident, filing a complaint in California state court
against the NationalEnquirer, a national magazine with its principal place
of business in Florida. The other two defendants-the author and editor of
the defamatory article-were both Florida residents. In judging minimum
contacts, the Court reasoned, a court should focus on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." 46 The unanimous
Court adopted an "effect" theory: "[h]ere, the plaintiff is the focus of the
activities of the defendants out of which the suit arises." 47 The Court
highlighted the following facts of the case:

42

Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-802 (1984).

4s Id at 775.
44 Id at 781.
45 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-791 (1984).
46 Id at 788. Id In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), when tracking the history of
InternationalShoe jurisprudence, Justice Marshall wrote: "the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which
the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction."
47 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added).
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[t]he allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a
California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer
whose television career was centered in California. The article was
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both
of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California.4 8

Based on these facts, the Court concluded: "In sum, California is the focal
point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over
petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their
Florida conduct in California." 49
So far, from the wording of the above statement, "effect" theory
seemed sufficient for finding "minimum contacts." However, in response
to petitioners' arguments, the Calder Court added a "targeting"element in
order to distinguish intentional torts from product liability cases based on
negligence. Here, the Court highlighted the following facts:
Their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed
at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an
article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact
upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be
felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in
which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the
circumstances, petitioners must 'reasonably anticipate being hauled
into court there' to answer for the truth of the statements made in their
article.50

The Court therefore ruled that jurisdiction in California was proper
because defendants' "intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause
injury to respondent in California.""
The "targeting" element in Calder appears to be a "purposeful
direction" rule for intentional torts, similar to the "purposeful availment"
doctrine for negligence. 5 2 If this is the case, then, Calder provides two
theories of "minimum contacts"-effects and purposeful direction. While
the factual pattern of Calder is a coherent combination of the two, Keeton
is not. The forum state in Keeton was New Hampshire, whose only contact

48 Id. at 788-89.
49

s

Id at 789 (emphasis added).
Id at 789-90 (emphasis added).

s' Id at 791.
52

In Burger King, the Supreme Court treated this as the same rule. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985). Later, the Supreme Court made it clear that "[its] 'minimum contacts'
analysis looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts
with persons who reside there." Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
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with the magazine in question was the latter's circulation. There was no
additional "targeting."
The Supreme Court has not ruled on personal jurisdiction in
defamation cases since the advent of the internet age. 53 Federal courts and
state courts have struggled with the ambiguity of Calder and Keeton and
translating the purposeful availment doctrine into rules for the online
world. They can be divided into two schools of thought: a minority of the
state courts adopt Calder into an "effect" theory; other courts are not
satisfied with "effect" alone, and require a "targeting" element. The latter
approach makes it harder for internet users to establish personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident thirty-party digital platform.
2. The "Effect" Theory
Among state courts, Ohio and Florida find Calder directly
applicable in online defamation cases. In Kauffman Racing Equipment v.
Roberts, 4 a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio, a seller of automobile
engine blocks based in Ohio filed a libel complaint in state court against
Scott Roberts, a customer based in Virginia, for the latter's online postings
on various websites devoted to automobile racing equipment. A majority
of the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that personal jurisdiction was
justified because the tort occurred in Ohio, even though online:
Roberts posted his allegedly defamatory statements on the Internet,
ostensibly for the entire world to see. How much of the world saw the
comments is unknown; but we do know that at least five Ohioans saw
Roberts's statements. The comments were thus published in Ohio.
Because Roberts's allegedly defamatory statements were published in
Ohio, his alleged tort was committed in Ohio, and he falls within the
grasp of [Ohio's long-arm statute]."

The Ohio Supreme Court noted that Calder itself did not involve internet
communication, but considered the factual pattern in Calder similar
enough. 56 As in Calder, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court
concluded that "[t]he effects analysis necessitates conduct 'calculated to
cause injury' in a 'focal point' where the 'brunt' of the injury is
experienced."57
" Borchers, supra note 36, at 475.
5 Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ohio 2010).
5 Id at 791.
56 Id at 795.
57 Id at796.

Vol. 39, No. I

JudicialDivergence in Cyberspace

15

A similar question was raised in an Eleventh Circuit case, which
certified that question to the Supreme Court of Florida. 58 There, the
plaintiff was a recruiting firm based in Nevada with its principal place of
business in Florida; defendant was a resident of Washington State who
owned and operated a non-commercial website on consumer-related
issues. The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that "allegedly
defamatory material about a Florida resident placed on the Web and
accessible in Florida constitutes an 'electronic communication into
Florida' when the material is accessed (or 'published') in Florida." 5 9 What
is in common between the Florida and Ohio Supreme Courts is that they
took Calder's effect theory as sufficient ground for asserting jurisdiction;
they did not ask for the targeting element. In the online world, the effectonly standard makes the court easily accessible to plaintiffs. However,
other states and federal courts are not comfortable with this approach.
Rather, they demand both elements in Calder-effect plus targeting-in
order to meet the Due Process requirement.
3. The "Effect Plus Targeting" Theory
In Griffis v. Luban, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a
court in Alabama did not have personal jurisdiction over a resident in
Minnesota for critical postings on an online newsgroup. 60 In discussing the
jurisprudence, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the majority of
"courts have consistently refused to find jurisdiction based on Calder
merely because the plaintiff was located in the forum state and therefore
felt the effects of the alleged intentional tortious conduct there." 6i
"Instead," the court highlighted, "the courts have construed Calder as

58
59

Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2009) (certifying the legal
question to the Supreme Court of Florida).
Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1214 (Fla. 2010). The Supreme Court of Florida
distinguished defamatory material "accessible" and "accessed" in Florida:

We conclude that posting defamatory material on a website alone does not constitute
the commission of a tortious act within Florida.. . . Rather, the material posted on the
website about a Florida resident must not only be accessible in Florida, but also be
accessed in Florida in order to constitute the commission of the tortious act of
defamation within Florida under [Florida statute].
Id. at 1203. The Internet Solutions ruling was later applied by the Eleventh Circuit. See Catalyst
Pharms., Inc. v. Fullerton, 748 Fed. Appx. 944 (11th Cir. 2018).
60 Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn. 2002).
61 Id. at 533.
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requiring more than mere effects in the forum state."62 In California, the
supreme court has not ruled on an online defamation case; but it ruled in a
trade secret case that exercising personal jurisdiction solely based on
internet postings violated Due Process. 63 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth District ruled in Burdick v. Superior Court that the posting of
defamatory statements on Facebook itself was insufficient to create the
minimum contacts necessary to support personal jurisdiction in a lawsuit
against a non-resident. 64 More recently, the same court of appeals ruled in
a defamation case against a resident in Canada; when the social media
postings explicitly target California, it satisfies the minimum contacts
requirement. 65
In New York, the statutory language explicitly exempts causes of
action for defamation. 66 New York courts recognize a "clear distinction
between a situation where the only act which occurred in New York was
the mere utterance of the libelous material and on the other hand, a
situation where purposeful business transactions have taken place in New
York giving rise to the cause of action." 67 The New York Court of Appeals
answered this question in the SPCA case. 68 There, a New York animal
shelter filed a defamation case against a donor, a non-profit corporation
based in Ohio, who posted critical comments on its own website alleging
mistreatment of animals at the shelter. 69 The question became whether the
defendants' activities-two short visits and three telephone conversations
with the shelter, plus a donation of cash-constituted "purposeful
activities" related to the alleged defamation.70 The court of appeals
concluded that they did not. 71 Not only did the court consider that these
activities were "quite limited," 72 but also said, "there is no substantial
relationship between the allegedly defamatory statements and defendants'
New York activities." 73

Id
Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 10-11 (Cal. 2002).
64 Burdick v. Superior Court, Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 12 (Ct.
App. 2015).
65 San Pedro v. Menorca, No. G058050, 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4852
at *15-16 (July 29,
2020).
66 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 2020).
67 Legros v. Irving, 327 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (App.
Div. 1971).
68 SPCA of Upstate N.Y. Inc. v. Am. Working Collie Ass'n, 963 N.E.2d 1226, 1228-30
(N.Y. 2012).
62
63

69

71

Id

at 1228.

SId. at 1228-29.
Id at 1229.

72

Id

73

id
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The Second Circuit shared the same view. In Best Van Lines,74 a
moving company based in New York filed a suit in federal court in New
York against Tim Walker, a resident of Iowa who owned and operated a
website giving information and reviews of house movers. Applying New
York law, the Second Circuit concluded that "the nature of Walker's
comments does not suggest that they were purposefully directed to New
Yorkers rather than a nationwide audience." 75 In coming to this
conclusion, the Second Circuit follows the jurisprudence that "New York
courts construe 'transacts any business within the state' more narrowly in
defamation cases than they do in the context of other sorts of litigation."76
The Fourth Circuit did the same in Young v. New Haven Advocate,
an online defamation case.77 Similarly, in Revell v. Lidov, the Fifth Circuit
did not find a university website containing an allegedly defamatory article
constituted substantial contacts under the Texas long-arm statute.78 The
Seventh Circuit is shifting its position from its earlier broad application of
Calderto a position that is more open to inquire for "something more," as
can be seen in Tamburo v. Dworkin.79 The First Circuit has not spoken on
this issue. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts has ruled in
favor of a restrictive reading of Calder and adopted the Zippo test. 80
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has not spoken on the issue." In trademark
Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 240 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 248.
76 Id. at 253.
77 See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (construing Virginia's long-arm
statute). See also ALC Scan, Inc. v. Digit. Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002)
(construing Maryland's long-arm statute).
78 Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473-76 (5th Cir. 2002).
7 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (Illinois long-arm statute). The Seventh
Circuit emphasized in its conclusion:
74

75

although they acted from points outside the forum state, these defendants specifically
aimed their tortious conduct at [plaintiff] and his business in Illinois with the
knowledge that he lived, worked, and would suffer the 'brunt of the injury' there. These
allegations suffice to establish personal jurisdiction over these defendants under either
a broad or a more restrictive view of Calder.
Id. at 706.
80 See Broadvoice Inc. v. TP Innovations, L.L.C., 733 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226 (D. Mass. 2010)
(construing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
81 In an unpublished opinion, HealthcareAlliance Inc. v. Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 Fed. App'x 339
(9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit leaned towards a direct application of Calder. In this case, the
defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Colorado that
operated a website that rated home health care providers. Id. at 339. Plaintiff, a Washington Statebased home health care provider, filed a suit after learning it had received what it considered an
unfavorable rating on defendant's website. Id. at 339-40. The district court dismissed the case for
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and copyright cases, the Ninth Circuit demanded "more" than what Calder
requires.82 One federal district court in the Ninth Circuit believes that "the
Ninth Circuit as well as the majority of jurisdictions, have rejected the
holding that merely posting information on an otherwise passive website
is sufficient."83
In cyberspace, the majority of the federal and state courts in the
United States require a "targeting" element in their interpretation of the
"purposeful availment" doctrine in Calder. By contrast, as will be
discussed in Part II, not all other jurisdictions required this targeting
element. Requiring "targeting" makes the court much less accessible for
internet users.
B. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA

The second area of law is a general immunity granted to digital
platforms and internet service providers under Section 230, which was
initially enacted in 1996 as part of Title V of the Telecommunications
Act.8 4 In June 1997, however, the United States Supreme Court struck
down part of it for abridging freedom of speech protected by the First

82

83

84

lack of personal jurisdiction as it found defendant's website merely a passive provider of
information. Id. at 340. The Ninth Circuit, relying on Calder, found that the defendant "has
purposefully interjected itself into the Washington state home-healthcare market through its
intentional act of offering ratings of Washington medical service providers. This act was expressly
aimed at plaintiff's forum state. ... "Id. at 341. But see 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) (circuit rule establishing
that unpublished dispositions of the court are not precedent); Pedroza v. BRB, 624 F.3d 926, 931
(9th Cir. 2010) ("[A]n unpublished decision is not precedent for our panel.").
In a trademark case, for example, see Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d
1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("We have said [in Panavision]that there must
be 'something more,' but have not spelled out what that something more must be. . .. We now
conclude that 'something more' is what the Supreme Court described as 'express aiming' at the
forum state."). For a copyright case, see Mavrix Photo, Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Calder as requiring express aiming to establish jurisdiction. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs.,
Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011).
Medihah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (D. Nev. 2002). The court noted
here that there was no evidence that any Nevada resident actually did access the alleged
defamation. Id. at 1136. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege defamatory postings
were directed at forum state. The District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed
with this position. See Phillips v. World Publishing Co., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1123-24 (W.D.
Wash. 2011) ("[C]ourts should not focus too narrowly on the test's third prong-the effects
prong-because 'something more' is needed in addition to a mere foreseeable effect. That
'something more' is 'express aiming."') (quoting Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087).
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137-39.
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Amendment.8 5 Section 230 became 230(c)(1): "No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider." 86
When the CDA was proposed in 1995, Senator James Exon (DNeb.) was primarily driven by concerns of online pornography. 87 Its basic
framework was based on the conceptual distinction between publisher and
distributor in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,"" and its primary target was
"content providers." 89 During congressional deliberations, Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., an internet tort case questioning
the publisher-distributer distinction in Cubby, 90 caught the attention of
lawmakers. Senator Coats specifically mentioned Stratton Oakmont
during the Senate floor debate:
I understand that in a recent N.Y. State decision, Stratton Oakmont
versus Prodigy, the court held that an online provider who screened for
obscenities was exerting editorial content control. This led the court to
treat the online provider as a publisher, not simply a distributor, and to
therefore hold the provider responsible for defamatory statements
made by others on the system. I want to be sure that the intent of the
amendment is not to hold a company who tries to prevent obscene or
indecent material under this section from being held liable as a

85 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). See also Claudia Oliveri, Congress Wrestles with the
Internet: ACLU v. Reno and the CommunicationsDecency Act, 6 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 12 (1997).
See generally Charles Nesson & David Marglin, The Day the InternetMet the FirstAmendment
Time and the Communications Decency Act, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 113 (1996) (discussing the

constitutional challenges to the CDA leading to Reno v. ACL U).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
87 Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act
RegulatingBarbarianson the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMMC'Ns L.J. 51, 53 (1996).
86

Vikas Arora, Note, The Communications Decency Act CongressionalRepudiation of the "Right
Stuff," 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 473, 474 (1997). Regulating the Internet Should PornographyGet
a Free Ride on the Information Superhighway - A Panel Discussion, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.

L.J. 343, 344-45 (1996).
See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that
passive providers of online services and content were not charged with knowledge of, or
responsibility for, the content on their network).
89 H.R. REP. NO.104-458, at 190 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) ("This provision is designed to target the
criminal penalties of new sections 223(a) and (d) at content providers who violate this section and
persons who conspire with such content providers, rather than entities that simply offer general
access to the Internet and other online content. The conferees intend that this defense be construed
broadly to avoid impairing the growth of online communications through a regime of vicarious
liability."). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (defining "information content provider" to mean "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.").
90 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
88

1995).
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publisher for defamatory statements for which they would not
otherwise have been liable.9 1

Section 230 became the fundamental U.S. policy for the internet
era. In 2010, the United States Congress extended it beyond U.S. territory
by instructing federal courts not to recognize or enforce foreign
defamation judgments that are inconsistent with Section 230.92 While it
has faced challenges in recent years, 93 Section 230 still remains the law in
the United States. 94 Over time, federal courts accumulated a number of
cases on Section 230 showing that they tend to give generous immunity to
digital platforms or internet service providers. This jurisprudence is
reflected in three aspects: courts tend to read Section 230 broadly, thus
brushing aside the role played by digital platforms; courts developed the
notion of "material contribution" to measure the role of digital platforms
when they cannot avoid the question; even notification is often not
considered as a decisive factor in deciding negligence.
1. BroadReading of Section 230
In early cases, courts adopted a broad reading of Section 230. The
Fourth Circuit Court led the way through its decision in Zeran v. America
Online, Inc.95 Here, plaintiff Kenneth Zeran alleged defamatory messages
posted on an America Online bulletin board by an unidentified person.

141 Cong. Rec. 16,024-25 (1995).
28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1); Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional
Heritage Act of 2010 § 4102, 28 U.S.C. § 4102.
93 For example, see Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020), in which President
Donald Trump used the executive order to attack Section 230. William Barr, U.S. Att'y Gen.,
Remarks at the National Association of Attorneys General 2019 Capital Forum (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-nationalassociation-attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/8HR4-BC8W]. On June 17, 2020, DOJ issued
recommendations for Section 230 reform. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Justice
Department Issues Recommendations for Section 230 Reform (June 17, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-recommendations-section-230-reform
[https://perma.cc/CV4W-GU2C]. The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) once
endorsed an amendment to the Communications Decency Act of 1996. On July 24, 2013, fortyseven state attorneys general wrote a letter to Congressional leaders, asking Congress to amend
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to carve all state criminal laws from the statute's
protection. See NAAG Supports Amendment to the Communications Decency Act (May 23, 2019)
https://www.naag.org/naag/media/naag-news/naag-supports-amendment-to-the-communicationsdecency-act.php [https://perma.cc/5TA4-K2KZ].
9"

92

94 See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, N.Y.U. STERN CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA: THE FIGHT OVER SECTION 230-AND BEYOND (2020) (discussing
95

the controversy over the law and making recommendations for its improvement).
Zeranv. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Zeran notified America Online (AOL) of the messages but AOL did not
take them down. 96 Zeran did not bring any action against the unidentified
person who posted the offensive messages, but instead filed a complaint
against AOL. 97 When AOL moved to dismiss the case based on CDA
Section 230, the district court granted the motion. 98 Zeran appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.99
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit framed
Section 230 in terms much broader than was required for the fact pattern
of the case. "By its plain language," the Fourth Circuit announced, "@ 230
creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service." o Without getting into the details of the CDA's legislative
history,0i the Fourth Circuit attributed a clear goal and rationale based on
freedom of speech: "Congress recognized the threat that tort-based
lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning internet
medium."iO2 The Fourth Circuit even added the key word "broad" to
statutory language:
Fearing that the specter of liability would therefore deter service
providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress
enacted §230's broad immunity "to remove disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material." 103

Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit attempted to assign a global meaning to
Section 230 by insisting that "Section 230 represents the approach of
Congress to a problem of national and international dimension. "i04 While

96 Id
97

at 329.

Id

9s Id.at 33O.
99

Id

See also David R. Sheridan, Note, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act upon Liabilityfor Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REv. 147
(1997) (discussing Zeran's holding).
'1 The Zeran case was argued in front the Fourth Circuit on October 2, 1997, and its decision was
reached on November 12, 1997. A few months before the Zeran case, the CDA was challenged in
the United States Supreme Court, which decided on June 26, 1997, to strike down most of the
CDA as a violation of the First Amendment. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
102 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added).
'0 Id at 331 (emphasis added) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)).
'0 Id at 334.
100

Id
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the Zeran decision was widely questioned by commentators,0 5 on June
22, 1998, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari,1 06
which ended the legal uncertainty.
Other federal courts soon found the value of Zeran and followed
its direction. In Blumenthal v. Drudge,0 7 the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia faced a defamation case against AOL. Here, as the
provider of an interactive computer service, AOL contended that it only
disseminated content provided by someone else who authored the
defamatory statement under @ 230(c)(1). However, the author of the
defamatory statement, Matt Drudge, was an AOL contractor.108 After a
long quote from Zeran, the district court ruled that AOL entitled to Section
230 immunity, following Zeran.109 A similar question was raised in Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc." 0 Here, the Tenth Circuit
faced a defamation and negligence complaint by plaintiff, a publicly traded
company, against AOL for incorrect information concerning plaintiff's
stock price and share volume. AOL, which disseminated stock information
concerning more than 40,000 publicly traded stocks and securities through
its Quotes & Portfolios service, argued that two independent third-party
companies provided the information. The Tenth Circuit concluded that
"[i]mposing liability on [AOL] for the allegedly inaccurate stock
information provided by [third-party] would 'treat' [AOL] as the
'publisher or speaker,' a result @ 230 specifically proscribes.""'
Zeran gained momentum in May 2002, when a congressional
committee confirmed the rulings."t2 In 2003, Zeran spread to the Third and
105

E.g., Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet
Defamation Claims How FarShould Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 679-89 (2002); Susan
Freiwald, ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis in Cyberspace The Case of IntermediaryLiability

for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 594-96 (2001); Brian C. McManus, Rethinking
Defamation Liabilityfor Internet Service Providers, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 659 (2001);
Annemarie Pantazis, Zeran v. America Online, Inc. InsulatingInternet Service Providersfrom
Defamation Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 547-50 (1999); Michelle J. Kane, Internet
Service Providers' Liability Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 483, 498-500

(1999).
106 Zeranv. Am. Online, Inc., 524 U.S. 937, 937 (1998).
107
108

Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998).

109

Id

Id. at 51.

110 Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
" Id. at 986.
12 "The courts have correctly interpreted section 230(c), which was aimed at protecting against

liability for such claims as negligence ... and defamation.... The Committee intends these
interpretations of section 230(c) to be equally applicable to those entities covered by H.R. 3833."
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Seventh Circuits. 113 The Ninth Circuit also embraced Zeran in 2003,
though in a puzzling way. The first case in the Ninth Circuit was Batzel v.
Smith, where plaintiff brought defamation complaints against both the
author of the defamatory statement, as well as the operator of website and
listservs." 4 The key here was that the author emailed the statement to the
operator of the website, without knowing that the message would be
posted on the website. It was the website operator who chose the message
and edited it before posting it online. Was the website operator an
"information content provider" under @ 230(c)(1)? The Ninth Circuit was
split on this issue. The majority decided to add some conditions to the
standard Zeran category:
[A] service provider or user is immune from liability under § 230(c)(1)
when a third person or entity that created or developed the information
in question furnished it to the provider or user under circumstances in
which a reasonable person in the position of the service provider or
user would conclude that the information was provided for publication
on the Internet or other "interactive computer service." 15

Judge Gould, dissenting in part with the majority, believed that the
majority went too far."1 6 For Judge Gould,
[The court] should hold that the CDA immunizes a defendant only
when the defendant took no active role in selecting the questionable
information for publication. If the defendant took an active role in
selecting information for publication, the information is no longer
'information provided by another' within the meaning of § 230."1

By that standard, Judge Gould suggested, the defendant "is not entitled to
CDA immunity because [defendant] actively selected Smith's e-mail
message for publication." "8

13

"4
115

16
117

18

H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 13 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1741, 1749 (citation
omitted). H.R. 3833 was later passed as the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 2766.
In 2003, two other federal circuit courts joined the Fourth Circuit in following the Zeran decision.
See Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470-71 (3rd Cir. 2003) (failure to police its network). It
took some more time for other circuit courts to join them. See Almeida v. Amazon.com, 456 F.3d
1316, 1321-24 (1lth Cir. 2006); Johnsonv. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2010) (website
host sued for defamatory statements posted on an internet discussion board).
Batzelv. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id at 1034.
Id at 1036-41 (Gould, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id at 1038.
Id at 1040.
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Despite their differences, the majority and the dissent in Batzel
shared a common goal which was to reject the categorical approach in
Zeran. They suggested a case-by-case approach as an alternative to the
bright-line rule adopted by Zeran. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit was
unwilling to question the Zeran approach directly.'"
Less than two months later, the Ninth Circuit delivered the opinion
for Carafano v. Metrosplash (2003), where the Court yielded to Zeran
completely. Here, a third-party user of MetroSplash.com, a dating service
website, impersonated actress Christiane Carafano and created a profile on
the website without the latter's knowledge nor consent. The question was
whether the website was entitled to @ 230(c) immunity. The trial court, a
district court for the Central District of California, considered MetroSplash
an "information content provider" thus not entitled to immunity because
of its involvement in creating the profile through its application and
questionnaire.120 The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Here, the Ninth Circuit
conceded to the Zaren reading of Section 230, and acknowledged, for the
first, time, that "courts have treated @ 230(c) immunity as quite robust,
adopting a relatively expansive definition of 'interactive computer service'
and a relatively restrictive definition of 'information content provider. "'121
Based on that general direction from Zaren, the Ninth Circuit came up
with its own formula, "[u]nder the statutory scheme, an 'interactive
computer service' qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also
function as an 'information content provider' for the portion of the
statement or publication at issue."1 22 It repeated the sweeping statement:
"so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content,
the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the
specific editing or selection process."123
In sum, by the mid-2000s, federal courts had formed a consensus
in adopting a broad reading of Section 230, transforming the federal statute
to a fundamental legal framework for the internet era. More recently,
Later, the Ninth Circuit characterized its decision in Batzel as "join[ing] the consensus developing
across other courts of appeals that § 230(c) provides broad immunity for publishing content
provided primarily by third parties." Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2003).
121 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 2072 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066-68 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
121 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
122 Id at 1123.
1243 Id at 1124. In another case, the question was whether a suit against web-based
social media
network MySpace was barred by the CDA when its negligence in failing to verify the age of a girl
creating an account led to sexual assault by a predator. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422
(5th Cir. 2008).
119
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Section 230 was interpreted broadly in terms of its geographic coverage.124
Both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit reasoned that since the
primary purpose of Section 230 is to limit liability, thus it will limit
liability regardless. 2 5 As a result, Section 230 immunity, so far as digital
platforms are acting as publishers,1 2 6 is now global for U.S. courts.
2. Material Contribution
In some other cases, however, the role of the digital platform or
service provider cannot be avoided, even by a broad reading of Section
230. In these cases, a notion of "material contribution" was developed. In
FairHousing Council v. Roommate.com,1 27 the question was whether an
online roommate-matching website was entitled to Section 230 immunity,
despite the fact that it allegedly violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for
discriminatory information. The trial court followed Carafano and ruled
that Roommate was protected by immunity. 128 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit panel was split.1 2 9 In April 2008, the Ninth Circuit reheard the
matter en banc. The en banc Court was split. The majority, led by Judge

124 See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 74 (2nd Cir. 2019); Gonzalez v. Google, 2 F.4th 871,

888 (9th Cir. 2021). The facts of these two cases are similar. In both cases, victims of overseas
terrorist attacks filed suits against digital platforms for their roles in terrorist groups' recruitment
and propagation of terror. Force, 934 F.3d at 57; Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 880. Platforms claimed
Section 230 immunity. Force, 934 F.3d at 62; Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 882. Plaintiffs argued that that
Section 230 did not explicitly cover territory outside the United States, in accordance with the
doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality. Force, 934 F.3d at 62; Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 882.
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected this claim. Force, 934 F.3d at 74; Gonzalez, 2 F.4th
at 912-13.
125 The Second Circuit ruled that Section 230's "primary purpose is limiting civil liability in American
courts." Force, 934 F.3d at 74. Because litigation of civil claims occurs in the United States courts,
presumption against extraterritoriality is no barrier to the application of Section 230. Id. at 74. The
Ninth Circuit closely followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit when it stated "because §
230(c)(1) focuses on limiting liability, the relevant conduct occurs where immunity is imposed,
which is where Congress intended the limitation of liability to have an effect, rather than the place
where the claims principally arose." Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 888.
126 In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit left one issue open: plaintiffs argued for liability on a theory that
Google generated revenue by selling advertising space through its AdSense program, thus Google
shared the revenue with users on the latter's videos. 2 F.4th at 898. The Ninth Circuit ruled Section
230 did not cover it. Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs' revenue-sharing allegations
"are not directed to the publication of third-party information. These allegations are premised on
Google providing ISIS with material support by giving ISIS money." Id.
127 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2008) (enbanc).
128 Fair Hous. Councilv. Roommate.com, LLC, No. CV 03-09386PA, 2004 WL 3799488,
at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2004).
129 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated
en banc, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Alex Kozinski, found that CDA immunity did not apply to Roommate in
two aspects. First, when users create a personal profile on its website,
Roommate's questionnaire asked for information on race and sexual
orientation, which may have violated the FHA.1 30 The majority believed
that "[t]he CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties to
express illegal preferences."' 3' Roommate became an information content
provider under Section 230, because "Roommate's own acts-posting the
questionnaire and requiring answers to it-are entirely its doing and thus
section 230 of the CDA does not apply to them." 132 Second, after
registration, Roommate creates a personal profile and user's
discriminatory preferences are displayed on her profile page; and
Roommate even let users search its database.'33 The majority ruled that
Roommate became "much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that
information." 34 The majority considered the search function problematic
as it was "similarly designed to steer users based on discriminatory
criteria."135 In that aspect, according to the majority, it differs materially
from generic search engines such as Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live
Search.1 36 Here the majority adopted a "material contribution" standard
equivalent to the role of an editor who makes the "affirmative decision to
publish," "so he contributes materially to its allegedly unlawful
dissemination. He is thus properly deemed a developer and not entitled to
CDA immunity."137
The dissent, led by Judge McKeown, however, argued Carafano
controlled here, 138 and believed the majority's opinion created an
"unprecedented expansion of liability for internet service providers
[which] threatens to chill the robust development of the internet that
Congress envisioned." 139 Guided by a broad reading of Section 230
immunity, the argument continued, regardless of what Roommate did, it
was "the users [who] have furnished this information to Roommate for
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
1165.
132 Id. at 1165.
133 Id at 1167.
134 Id at 1166.
135 Id at 1167.
136 Id at 1167.
137 Id at 1171.
138 Id at 1186 (McKeown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Carafano presented
circumstances virtually indistinguishable from those before us....").
139 Id at 1176.
'0

131 Id. at
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Roommate to publish in their profiles." 4 "The profile is created solely by
the user, not the provider of the interactive website. Indeed, without user
participation, there is no information at all."141 This position gained
support in Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., where Judge McKeown led a unanimous
panel holding that Yelp's rating system, based on user's inputs, "is best
characterized as the kind of neutral tool operating on voluntary inputs,"
therefore covered by Section 230 immunity.1 4 2
The "material contribution" test, which initially targeted the
design and function of a website or app, later became a test of the behavior
of the website operator. In FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., the website operator
"solicited requests for confidential information protected by law, paid
researchers to find it, knew that the researchers were likely to use improper
methods, and charged customers who wished the information to be
disclosed."1 43 In Huon v. Denton, the Seventh Circuit commented that "[a]
company can . .. be liable for creating and posting, inducing another to
post, or otherwise actively participating in the posting of a defamatory
statement in a forum that that company maintains."144 In Jones v. Dirty
World, the Sixth Circuit ruled that, though the operator of the website
selected the statements for publication, he had not "materially contributed
to the defamatory content" because he did not author them.1 45 The Sixth
Circuit's ruling makes "material contribution" meaningless as a judicial
scrutiny by returning to the "publisher" and "distributor" distinction.
3. Notification
As can be seen in Part II, all jurisdictions outside the United States
treat notification as a decisive factor in deciding negligence on the side of
the digital platforms or service provider. Notification is also raised by
plaintiffs from time to time in American courts. The first test came to the
federal court right after Section 230 was enacted, in Zeran v. America
Online, Inc.1 4 6 Zeran argued that the fact that he had notified AOL of the

4oId.

at 1185.

41 Id at 1182.

142 Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2016). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found a
consumer review website was covered by Section 230 immunity. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2009).
143 FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009).
44 Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2016).
45 Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415 (6th Cir. 2014).
146 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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defamatory statements on the AOL bulletin board and AOL had not
removed them made it negligence, regardless of Section 230 immunity to
publishers. 147 The Fourth Circuit was not convinced: "Zeran simply
attaches too much importance to the presence ofthe distinct notice element
in distributor liability."1 48 The Court concluded: "Liability upon notice
would defeat the dual purposes advanced by @ 230 of the CDA."1 49 In
Universal Communication v. Lycos, Inc., the First Circuit joined other
courts that have held that Section 230 immunity applies even after notice
of the potentially unlawful nature of the third party content." 0 In Barnes
v. Yahoo, plaintiff Cecilia Barnes broke off a lengthy relationship with her
boyfriend, who then responded by posting profiles of Barnes on a website
run by Yahoo."' Barnes notified Yahoo to remove the profiles, and the
latter promised removal. However, Yahoo did not remove them until after
Barnes filed the complaint in court. Barnes argued in court that although
it may have had no initial responsibility to act, once Yahoo undertook to
act, it must do so reasonably. 152 The Ninth Circuit did not find this
persuasive. According to the court:
[T]he duty that Barnes claims Yahoo violated derives from Yahoo's
conduct as a publisher-the steps it allegedly took, but later
supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the offensive profiles. It is
because such conduct is publishing conduct that we have insisted that
section 230 protects from liability. 15 3

The Ninth Circuit was conscious that, after FairHousing, it was following
a "careful exegesis of the statutory language" rather than resting on a
"broad statement of immunity." 5 4 Nevertheless, the court's reading of
Section 230 is still broad because it refused to consider whether Yahoo
was a publisher-therefore within the protection of Section 230-is
changed by notification.
When there is no promise made to remove harmful content, then
Section 230 becomes a complete defense. One example is Klayman v.
Zuckerberg,5 5 where an anti-Semitic hate-speech page created by a third-

147 Id at 332.
148 Id
149 Id at 333.
1

Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007).

151 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
152 Id at 1102.

Id at 1103.
at 1100.
155 Klaymanv. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
153

154 Id
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party user appeared on Facebook, and plaintiff Larry Klayman complained
that Facebook did not remove the page timely. The D.C. Circuit found that
Facebook was entitled to immunity under Section 230. The court
commented that to the extent that Klayman did not claim breach of
contract, his case could not be saved. 5 6 Similarly, the Second Circuit ruled
in Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456 that without a promise made to a
user, the website owner who refused to remove defamatory contents was
protected by Section 230.117
In sum, Section 230 cases reflect a strong judicial policy of
providing a broad, generous immunity to digital platforms and service
providers. This broad Section 230 immunity, when combined with a
demanding personal jurisdiction requirement, makes court less accessible
for millions of internet users. Other jurisdictions, however, adopt a very
different legal approach. The remainder of this Article will demonstrate
that, outside of the United States, other jurisdictions uniformly make their
courts more accessible. This is achieved by extending the jurisdiction of
their courts, adopting negligence standard for digital platforms' liabilities,
and increasingly embracing global injunctions as remedies for civil

liabilities.
II. GLOBALIZATION OF JURISDICTION

The first area ofjudicial divergence is jurisdiction. In contrast with
the "minimum contacts" standard based on effect plus targeting, courts in
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and
China tend to treat effect as a decisive factor in asserting jurisdiction. As
a result, internet users in these jurisdictions are able to file suit in their
local court against service providers or even their digital platforms in
California. Ironically perhaps, "globalization of jurisdiction," 158 an
American idea, is more readily embraced elsewhere.
A. COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

The first defamation case arising from the internet in Australia
was Gutnick v. Dow Jones, filed in November 2000 by Joseph Gutnick
156
157

158

Id. at 1359.
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a suit against a
website owner who refused to remove defamatory newsletters was barred by CDA).
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 321 (2002)
(arguing for a community-based cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction).
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against Dow Jones at the Supreme Court of Victoria (SCV, the trial
court).' 5 9 The legal issue regarded where the defamatory statement was
made. Plaintiff Gutnick alleged that an article published in Barrons
magazine-as well as on the Wall Street Journal'swebsite, WSJ.comcontained defamatory content. Gutnick was a resident in the State of
Victoria, Australia, while Dow Jones was a Delaware company with its
principal place of business in New York; the server of the website was in
South Brunswick, New Jersey. Justice Hedigan of SCV ruled that the trial
court had personal jurisdiction and thus granted writ to serve the process
outside of Australia. Dow Jones thus appeared in SCV court and
challenged the jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the summons. Both
the Court of Appeals in Victoria and the federal High Court of Australia
affirmed the ruling.1 60
Dow Jones argued in the trial court that internet publication
occurred when and where the material was uploaded to the server.161 The
trial court disagreed and held that "publication takes place where and when
the contents of the publication . .. are seen and heard . .. and
comprehended by the reader or hearer.", 6 2 Therefore, the court concluded,
libel "was published in the State of Victoria when downloaded by Dow
Jones subscribers." 163 The Australian High Court agreed. Following
Justice Dixon's statement in Lee v. Wilson & Mackinnon,164 Chief Justice
Gleeson concluded that "[i]t is where that person downloads the material
that the damage to reputation may be done. Ordinarily then, that will be
the place where the tort of defamation is committed." 65
What was particularly interesting in the Gutnick case was the
underlying dialogue with the U.S. law-a commentator called it
"negotiating [the] American legal hegemony." 6 6 Justice Hedigan, the trial

159 Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2001] VSC 305 (28 August 2001) (Austl.).
160 Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick [2001] VSCA 249 (21 September 2001) (Austl.); Dow Jones
161

Co Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (10 December 2002) (Austl.).
Gutnick, [2001] VSC 305, para. 21 (28 August 2001) ("It is not to be doubted that the core
submission of the defendant is that the Internet publication of 'Unholy Gains' occurred when and
where the material was uploaded in New Jersey, that is, when it was pulled from the server in New
Jersey.").

162 Id

para. 60.

163

id

164

Lee v. Wilson & Mackinnon, [1934] HCA 60, (1934) 51 CLR 276, 287 ("It is the publication, not
the composition of a libel, which is the actionable wrong." Justice Dixon). Gutnick, [2002] HCA
56, para. 25.

165 Id

para. 44.
166 Brian Fitzgerald, Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick: Negotiating American Legal Hegemony' in the
TransnationalWorld of Cyberspace, 27 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 590, 610 (2003).

'

Vol. 39, No. I

JudicialDivergence in Cyberspace

31

judge, found that the United States Supreme Court decision in Calder
supported his conclusion on finding jurisdiction.1 67 He was not moved
when Dow Jones "remind[ed] me more than once that I held the fate of
freedom of dissemination of information on the Internet in my hands." 68
Justice Hedigan describes the position insisted on by Dow Jones as "[t]o
say that the country where the article is written, edited and uploaded and
where the publisher does its business, must be the forum is an invitation
to entrench the United States, the primary home of much of Internet
publishing, as the forum."169 The Gutnick decision was the first act of
revolt against the U.S. hegemony-ruling against a major American
corporation and asserted jurisdiction on jurisprudence in defiance of the
U.S. law.
In England, the Gutnick decision was fully embraced as an update
of the English common law. 7 0 The English Court of Appeal considered in
2004 that Gutnick brought English common law to the internet age.17
Even Dow Jones has clearly accepted the position, and in a subsequent
case, it did not even bother to challenge the English court's jurisdiction.172
In Canada, the Supreme Court of British Columbia came close to
embracing the Gutnick decision in Crookes v. Yahoo in 2007.173 Here,
defendant Yahoo had neither physical presence nor bank accounts in
British Columbia. Yahoo offered a service called "Yahoo! Groups," which
enabled users to create topic-oriented online discussion groups. One such
group was "GPC-Members Group" a forum about the Green Party of
Canada. Access to postings and information was restricted to individuals
who were invited by the manager of the Group, and not available to the

167
168

Gutnick, [2001] VSC 305, para. 57.

170

Shortly before the Gutnick decision in Australia, Dow Jones had a similar case in England. See
Chadha & Osicom Techs. Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. [1999] EWCA (Civ) 1415 (Eng.). The
Forbes magazine had a similar case, which was litigated all the way to the House of Lords. See
Berezovsky v. Michaels and Others, Glouchkov v. Michaels and Others [2000] UKHL 25, [2000]
(appeals taken from Eng.). However, both cases were decided based on the print version of the
newspaper or magazine, without touching the issue of online libel.
Lennox Lewis & Others v. Don King [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329 [29] (appeal taken from Eng.)
("In Gutnick v Dow Jones the High Court of Australia firmly rejected a challenge, in the context
of Internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as that vouchsafed in Duke of
Brunswick."). Duke of Brunswick was an 1849 decision by the Queen's Bench. The Duke of
Brunswick v. Harmer (1849) 117 Eng. Rep. 75, 14 Q.B. 185.
Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Jameel [2005] EWCA (Civ) 75 [16] (Eng.) ("Dow Jones made no
challenge to English jurisdiction.").
Crookes v. Yahoo, 2007 BCSC 1325 (Can.) (B.C.), aff'd, Crookes v. Yahoo, 2008 BCCA 165

Id para. 44.
169 Id para. 73.
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172

173

(Can) (B.C.).
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general public. Plaintiff, Wayne Crookes, was not a member of the GPCMembers Group, and filed a complaint against Yahoo alleging certain
postings made by the GPC-Members Group defamed him. Yahoo
challenged the jurisdiction of the court by arguing that "[i]n order for this
court to assume jurisdiction over Yahoo, there must be a real and
substantial connection between the cause of action against Yahoo and
British Columbia."17 4 The court was ready to embrace Gutnick, by stating
that "[w]ith respect to internet communications, the site of the alleged
defamation is where the damage to reputation occurs." Citing Gutnick, it
continued: "It is when a person downloads the impugned material from the
internet that the damage to the reputation may be done, and it is at that
time and place that the tort of defamation is committed." 7 7 However, the
court found such allegations missing in the plaintiff's pleadings: "Mr.
Crookes must show that alleged defamatory postings on the GPCMembers website, hosted by Yahoo on servers outside British Columbia,
were accessed, downloaded and read by someone in British Columbia,
thereby damaging his reputation in British Columbia. Mr. Crookes has
neither alleged nor tendered any evidence... ."176
This is one step further than the same court went in Wiebe v.
Bouchard, when the court announced that it had jurisdiction in libel cases
even if the defamatory libel posted on a Canadian Government's website
was authored by Quebec residents in Quebec. 7 7 The Supreme Court of
Canada has not spoken directly on Gutnick, but it has taken notice of the
case with approval in Society of Composers v. CanadianAssociation of
Internet Providers, and considered it part of the "broader context" in its
discussion of online copyright infringement.178
Courts in Commonwealth countries responded to the arrival of the
internet by adopting a nuanced notion of "publication" in defamation
cases, which is functionally closer to the "effect" theory in the United
States. By eliminating the need for "targeting," they made courts more
accessible to millions of users.

174

175
176

Crookes v. Yahoo, 2007 BCSC 1325, para. 28 (Can.) (B.C.).
Id para. 26.
Id para. 29.

"7 Wiebe v. Bouchard, 2005 BCSC 47, paras. 33, 39 (Can.) (B.C.). See also Burke v. NYP Holdings
Inc., 2005 BCSC 1287 (Can.) (B.C.).
178 Canadian Ass'n of Internet Providers v. Soc'y Composers, Authors & Music Publishers Canada,
2004 SCC 45, para. 41 (Can.).

Vol. 39, No. I

JudicialDivergence in Cyberspace

33

B. EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has developed a similar doctrine since the
arrival of the internet. Like the "publication" notion in Commonwealth
countries, EU law was centered on the "effect," with the primary concern
being how to make courts accessible. Before the arrival of the internet, the
Brussels Convention, 179 Article 2 provided the general rule: persons
domiciled in a contracting state shall, whatever their nationality, be sued
in the courts of that state.1 80 However, there is special jurisdiction, which
allows, under Article 5(3), a person domiciled in a contracting state to be
sued in another contracting state, in matters relating to tort, delict or quasidelict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.' 8' In
Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, SA,' 8 2 the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) interpreted Article 5(3) as giving a plaintiff the option to file a
lawsuit either in the courts based on where the damage occurred, or in the
courts of the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred.
In Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA," 3 a defamation case brought by
residents in England against a French newspaper, the ECJ applied the
doctrine in Mines de Potasse d'Alsace and interpreted that "the place of
the event giving rise to the damage" in a defamation case "can only be the
place where the publisher of the newspaper in question is established,
since that is the place where the harmful event originated and from which
the libel was issued and put into circulation."1 84 This made the ECJ
consistent with the common law tradition. 185 Here, like in Mines de
Potasse d'Alsace, the European Court of Justice reiterated that the option
was given to the plaintiff: "Although there are admittedly disadvantages
to having different courts ruling on various aspects of the same dispute,
the plaintiff always has the option of bringing his entire claim before the

179

8
181

Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
July 28, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 189) arts. 2, 3. [hereinafter the Brussels Convention]. Signatories of
the 1990 Brussels Convention include Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.
Id art. 2.
Id. art. 5, para. 3.

Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.j. BierB.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735,
1748.
183 Case C-68/93, Shevillv. Presse All. S.A., 1995 E.C.R. I-450. See also Shevillv. Presse All. S.A.
[1996] AC 959 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
184 Case C-68/93, Shevillv. Presse All. S.A., 1995 E.C.R. I-450, ¶ 24.
182

185 Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the European Union, 36

VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 937 (1996).
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courts either of the defendant's domicile or of the place where the
publisher of the defamatory publication is established."18 6
The question of internet publication, however, is how to define the
place where the harmful event occurred. This was the question in eDate
Advertising Martinez.18 7 Here, the plaintiff domiciled in Germany." He
had been sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder case but was
released on parole in 2008. Defendant eDate Advertising was an Austrian
company operating a website publishing news, which included a report on
plaintiff's case.18 9 Plaintiff brought an action before a German court,
seeking an order from the court that the defendant refrain from using his
full name when reporting about the case. The main legal issue was whether
a German court had jurisdiction over an Austrian company. 190 The
German Federal Court of Justice (the Bundesgerichtshof) stayed
proceedings and referred the case to Court of Justice of the European

Union ("CJEU").191
The CJEU acknowledged the difficulty created by the internetdistribution of defamatory statements became world-wide in the online
world, thus traditional tools such as distribution of hard copies became less
useful.1 92 In the new context, the CJEU reasoned, the objective remained
the same, that is to make sure that "a person who has suffered an
infringement of a personality right by means of the internet may bring an
action in one forum in respect of all of the damage caused, depending on
the place in which the damage caused in the European Union by that
infringement occurred."1 93 In order to achieve this goal, the CJEU came
up with a new conceptual tool-the "center of interest." According to the

CJEU:
Given that the impact which material placed online is liable to have on
an individual's personality rights might best be assessed by the court
of the place where the alleged victim has his center of interests, the

Shevill, 1995 E.C.R. ¶ 32.
187 Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Advert. GmbH v. X & Martinez v. MGN Ltd., 2011
E.C.R. ¶ 19.
186

188 Id.

189 Id

¶
¶

15.
16.

190Id.¶18.

191 Id
192 Id
193 Id

¶ 24.
¶ 47
¶ 48.
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attribution of jurisdiction to that court corresponds to the objective of
the sound administration of justice. . . "4

The court did not elaborate on the "center of interests," but acknowledged
that "[t]he place where a person has the center of his interests corresponds
in general to his habitual residence."1 95 It indicates that other factors, such
as professional activity, may be relevant in considering the "center of
interests." This ruling is, in general, consistent with the Commonwealth
countries' practice of protecting the plaintiff's interest in ensuring a forum
is available for their grievances.1 96
In 2017, the CJEU explained the "center of interest" in
Bolagsupplysningen v. Handel.197 In this case, Bolagsupplysningen, an
Estonian company, brought a defamation action in Estonian court against
Svensk Handel, a Swedish trade association, for publishing incorrect
information on the latter's website.1 98 The alleged defamation was that
Svensk Handel included Bolagsupplysningen in a "blacklist" on their
website based on accusations of fraud and deceit.1 99 The question for the
Estonian court was whether it had jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
for defamation published in Swedish.2 oo The Riigikohus (the Supreme
Court, Estonia) referred the case to the CJEU.2 o'
Article 7(2) of Regulation No. 1215/2012 provides that a person
domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member States "in
matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place
where the harmful event occurred or may occur." 20 2 Following the CJEU's
decision in eDate Advertising, the parties agreed that Estonia was not the
place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred. So, the question

Id
195 Id
194

¶ 49.

196 Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Towards a EuropeanApproach in the Cross-BorderInfringementofPersonality

Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1681, 1697 (2011); Jan Oster, Rethinking Shevill Conceptualisingthe
EU Private InternationalLaw of Internet Torts Against Personality Rights, 26 INT'L REV. L.
COMPUTS. & TECH. 113, 118 (2012); Lorna Gillies, Jurisdictionfor Cross-Border Breach of
Personality and Defamation Edate Advertising and Martinez, 61 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1007,

1010-11 (2012).
197 Case C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningenv. Handel, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766,

¶9
199 Id ¶ 10.
200 Id ¶ 11.

¶ 33

(Oct. 17, 2017).

198 Id

201

Id ¶ 21.

202

Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (recast), O.J. (L 351) 1, 7(2).
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for the CJEU was whether Estonian courts had jurisdiction by virtue of
being the courts of the place where the alleged damage occurred. 20 3
In order to answer the question, the CJEU recalled that in eDate
Advertising, the person who considers that her rights have been infringed
"must have the option of bringing an action for damages, in respect of all
the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State in which the center
of [her] interests is based." 20 4 However, in this case, because the victim of
alleged internet defamation is a legal person (corporate entity)
Article 7(2) of Regulation No. 1215/2012 must be interpreted as
meaning that a legal person claiming that its personality rights have
been infringed by the publication of incorrect information concerning
it on the internet and by a failure to remove comments relating to that
person can bring an action for rectification of that information,
removal of those comments and compensation in respect of all the
damages sustained before the courts of the Member State in which its
centre of interests is located. 205

Because of the "centre of interests," the CJEU rejected the suggestion that
Article 7(2) means that a person can bring an action "before the courts of
each Member State in which the information published on the internet is
or was accessible." 20 6
In sum, the notion of "center of interest," created by the European
Court of Justice in response to the arrival of the internet, is essentially an
elaboration of "effect" theory under Calder. It serves the same purpose as
the elaboration of "publication" in Commonwealth courts, that is, to make
court open to the millions of internet users.
C. JAPAN

Since the Meiji era, Japan followed continental Europe closely in
developing its civil code and civil procedure. 207 Not surprisingly,
lawmakers and the courts in Japan responded to the arrival of the internet
like the European Union. In Japan, an online defamation case in the

203

Handel, Case C-194/16,

204

Id

205 Id
20>

¶ 30.

¶ 32.
¶ 44

Id.

207 Kohji Tanabe, The Process of Litigation An Experiment with the Adversary System, in LAW IN
JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 73, 77 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963).

A major revision was made to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1996. See Yasuhei Taniguchi, The
Development of an Adversary System in Japanese Civil Procedure, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING

POINT 80, 81, 92 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).
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Supreme Court of Japan in 2016, the Universal case, 20" had a striking
resemblance with the CJEU decision in Handel. In this 2016 Japanese
case, one of the plaintiffs, Universal Entertainment Corporation
(Universal), a Japanese corporation which manufactured, developed, and
distributed a gaming machine, was founded, and controlled by
entrepreneur Kazuo Okada. 2 09 Universal had a wholly owned subsidiary
Aruze Gaming America, Inc., incorporated in the State of Nevada in the
United States. 2 10 Aruze owned 20 percent of the defendant company's
(Wynn Resort Ltd.) shares, which operated a casino in Nevada.21
In early 2012, Wynn Resort alleged that Okada had engaged in
improper activities in the Philippines in violation of the United States
Foreign Corruption Practice Act (FCPA) and decided in a board meeting
to oust Aruze as a shareholder. The next day, the board meeting
resolution-including a statement on Okada's alleged violation of
FCPA-was posted on the defendant company's website. The statement
was in English. While defendant company and Aruze were engaged in
litigation in Nevada courts, 212 Universal filed an internet defamation
complaint against the defendant company in Tokyo District Court in
August 2012.213 The central question was whether courts in Japan had
jurisdiction.
On March 10, 2016, the Supreme Court of Japan (SCJ) decided
that this was one of the "special circumstances" under Article 3-9 of the
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure where Japanese courts should not
exercise jurisdiction. The final result is seemingly similar to the CJEU's

208

209

210

See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 10, 2016, 2014 (Ju) 1985, SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI

HANREISHU
[Minshu]
1,
https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1450
[https://perma.cc/2B3U-RAP6] [hereinafter Universal].
Id. While the disputes originated in the state of Nevada, the parties were engaged in litigation in
courts in Japan, as well as state courts in Nevada. Okada v. The Eighth Judicial District Court, 131
Nev. 834, 359 P.3d 1106 (2015). After the Supreme Court of Japan's 2016 ruling, the parties
continued their disputes in both Nevada state courts and federal courts. See Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v.
The Eighth Judicial District Court, 133 Nev. 369, 399 P.3d 334 (Nev. 2017); Okada v. The Eighth
Judicial District Court, 134 Nev. 6, 408 P.3d 566 (Nev. 2018). In federal court the case was
Universal Entertainment Corp. v. Aruze Gaming America, Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-00585-RFBNJK, 2020 WL 2840153 (D. Nev. May 30, 2020).
Universal, supra note 208; Okada v. The Eighth Judicial District Court, 359 P.3d at 1109 (Nev.
2015).

21 Universal, supra note 208.
212

213

Supra note 209.
Universal, supra note 208.
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decision in Handel.214 However, a closer examination shows that the SCJ
was more aggressive in claiming jurisdiction. Article 3-9 provides:
Even when the Japanese courts have jurisdiction over an action ...
the court may dismiss the whole or part of an action without prejudice
if it finds that there are special circumstances (tokubetsu no jij6, f4'
D I) because of which, if the Japanese courts were to conduct a trial
and reach a judicial decision in the action, it would be inequitable to
either party or prevent a fair and speedy trial, in consideration of the
nature of the case, the degree of burden that the defendant would have
to bear in responding to the action, the location of evidence, and other
circumstances.2 15

From its text, it is clear that Article 3-9 functions like the doctrine offorum
non conveniens in the United States, 216 by recognizing that the court has
jurisdiction, but should exercise its discretion, and decline to exercise that
jurisdiction. Therefore, the SCJ implied that Japanese courts did have
jurisdiction in a situation like this.
The legal foundation for jurisdiction in Japan, the Code of Civil
Procedure Article 3-3 (viii), 217 is similar to Article 7(2) of the EU
Regulation No. 1215/2012.218 What reason led the SCJ to conclude that
Japanese courts had jurisdiction in a case where defendant company

214 See Case C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen v. Handel, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766,

2017).

¶¶ 30,

44 (Oct. 17,

215 MINJI SOSHOHO [Minsoho] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 3-9 (Japan), translated in CODE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE
(Japanese
L.
Translation
[JLT
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2834&vm=04&re=02&new=1
[https://perma.cc/EF92-4BJ6] (last updated Mar. 22, 2012).
216

DS]),

See Koji Takahashi, The Jurisdiction of Japanese Courts in a Comparative Context, 11 J. PRIV.
INT'L L. 103, 104, 121, 127 (2015); Koji Takahashi, Japan'sNewly EnactedRules on International
Jurisdiction With a Reflection on Some Issues ofInterpretation,13 ANN. PRIV. INT'L L. 146, 156

(2011). See generally Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422
(2007) (discussing the doctrine of forum non conveniens). In this aspect, Japan differs from other
civil law countries who largely considerforum non conveniens inconsistent with civil law legal
systems. See RONALD A. BRAND, SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY,
GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT

AGREEMENTS 124-25 (Oxford 2007) (discussingforum non conveniens in Japan).
217

An action may be filed with the Japanese courts in the case of "an action for tort: if the place where
the tort occurred is within Japan (excluding if the consequences of a wrongful act committed in a
foreign country have arisen within Japan but it would not ordinarily have been possible to foresee
those consequences arising within Japan)." MINJI SOSHOHO [Minsoho] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 33(viii) (Japan), translatedin CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Japanese L. Translation [JLT DS]),

218

http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2834&vm=04&re=02&new=1
[https://penia.cc/LDD3-3QLV].
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (recast), O.J. (L 351) 1, 7(2).
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posted the statement (in English) on its website in Nevada, alleging
violation of U.S. law? The only reason would be because of what the
Supreme Court of Estonia asked the CJEU in Handel: the website is
accessible everywhere in the world, therefore the court of the place the
website is accessible has jurisdiction because that is the place where the
damage occurred. 2 1 9 In Handel, the CJEU did not endorse such a broad
approach; it adopted the "center of interest" theory to set limits on
jurisdiction.2 20 The SCJ achieved the same result as the CJEU did in
Handel, but through its discretion under the forum non conveniens
doctrine.
Japan's legal framework for international jurisdiction is relatively
new-it was introduced in 2011 when the Code of Civil Procedure was
amended.22 ' Japan closely follows the European Union when taking part
in the discussions and negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.222 On the question of jurisdiction in tort cases, it has
been consistent with the 1968 Brussels Convention, the 1990 Brussels
Convention, and the 1999 Draft Convention. 223 The language choice in
Article 3-3(viii), "action relating to torts" is understood as locus delicti
commissi (where a tort was committed). It came from Article 5(ix) of the
same Code of Civil Procedure, which is for allocating court jurisdiction in

219

221

See Handel, Case C-194/16 ¶¶ 30, 44.
See supra text accompanying notes 194-206. In 2005, the European Court of Justice ruled that
forum non conveniens was inconsistent with the Brussels Convention in Owusu v. Jackson, Case
C-281/02, Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice, Mar. 1, 2005. See Gilles Guniberti,
Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 973 (Oct. 2005).

221 Act for Partial Revision of Code of Civil Procedure and Civil Provisional Remedies Act, 54

JAPANESE Y.B. INT'L L. 723, 723 (2011), incorporated in MINJI SOSHOHO [Minsoho] [C. CIV.
PRO.] 1996, art. 3-9 (Japan), translated in CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Japanese Law Translation

[JLT
DS]),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2834&vm=04&re=02&new=1
[https://perma.cc/8BGK-P6X8]. See generally Masato Dogauchi, New Japanese Rules on
International Jurisdiction

General Observation,

54 JAPANESE Y.B. INT'L L. 260 (2011)

(discussing the drafting history of the amendment).
222 Yuko Nishitani, InternationalJurisdiction ofJapanese Courts in a Comparative Perspective, 60

NETH. INT'L L. REV. 251, 253 (2013). Japan started taking part in the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (HCCH) from 1904 (Meiji 37) as a non-European participant. See Masato
Dogauchi & Keisuke Takeshita, Japan's Participation in the Hague Conference of Private
International Law Based on Historical Sources, 7 ANN. PRIV. INT'L L. 140, 142 (2005).
223 See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial

Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, art. 10, Oct. 30, 1999, Prel. Doc. 11.
(2000),
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/638883f3-OcOa-46c6-b646-7a099d9bd95e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76JG-3JXE].
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domestic contexts. 22 4 The language 'the place where the tortious act
occurred,' (fuhokoi ga attachi, Ii½t o f 4it) includes two elements:
first, the place where a tortious act is committed (kagai koi chi, Mqt7lI1
), and second, the place where the consequence of the tort is felt (kekka
2 25
hasse chi,
_Mtl)
Traditionally, in Japan, it was understood that
either element could satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. 226 So what the
SCJ did in the Universal case, by relying on Article 3-9, was to declare
that the Japanese courts had jurisdiction, but that it was a wise exercise of
discretion to not claim it.
In sum, the SCJ's emphasis of discretion under the forum non
conveniens doctrine in deciding jurisdiction is functionally similar to the
CJEU's notion of "center of interest." What is equally amazing is that the
SCJ, which is not considered as active by American standards, is providing
a key function like the CJEU in the European Union, in Japan's response
to the arrival of the internet.
D. CHINA

As mentioned earlier, China differs from the first camp (the
United States) and the second camp (the Commonwealth countries, the
European Union, and Japan) in terms of political censorship, and in
denying global digital platforms access to its domestic market. Inside the
Chinese market, however, the structure is quite similar-national digital
platforms, such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent, dominate the national
market but they are concentrated in mega cities such as Beijing, Shenzhen,

224 Nozomi Tada [

fl 'Vi], International Civil Jurisdiction Based on the Place of the Tort, 55

JAPANESE Y.B. INT'L L. 287, 288 (2012). Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that "An
action set forth in one of the following items may be filed with the court of jurisdiction in the place
specified in said item: ... (ix) an action for a tort: the place where the tort took place ... " MINJI
SOSHOHO [Minsoho] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 5 (Japan), translatedin CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(Japanese
Law
Translation
[JLT
DS]),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2834&vm=04&re=02&new=1
[https://perma.cc/7L9B-KTUU].

225 Tada, supra note 224, at 297-98.
226

Tada states:
In practice, in determining international jurisdiction under Article 5(ix), Japanese
courts had recognized that both the place of act and the place of consequence were
equivalent and thus the plaintiff was entitled to sue the defendant at either place.
Accordingly, if either was located in Japan, jurisdiction of the Japanese courts was
recognized on the basis of the place where the tort was committed.
Id. at 299.
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and Hangzhou.2 2 7 Internet users across China also need to access local
courts for civil litigation. When these cases are not considered politically
sensitive, Chinese lawmakers and courts adopt similar rules to Japan and
the European Union in making courts accessible.
Wang Shen v. Google, one of the early cases of online copyright
disputes, was a copyright dispute between Google and author Wang Shen
decided by the Beijing No.1 Intermediate People's Court in December
2011.228 Wang alleged that Google and the operator of its China domain
website, www.Google.cn, infringed upon her copyrights by digitizing one
collection of her popular short novels and making the book available on
that website to its users without the author's permission. 229 Google
questioned the jurisdiction of the court by suggesting that digitization of
the book occurred in California because it was stored in a server in
California.230 The Beijing Court did not find the argument convincing. 2 3
The Beijing Court stated: "the place where the tort act occurred" (qinquan
xingwei di, R t it h It), according to the interpretation of the PRC
Supreme People's Court,232 included both the place where the tort is
committed (shishi di, ftii) and the place where results occurred (jieguo

227

228

Alibaba is headquartered in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. Company Overview, ALIBABA
GROUP,
https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/about/overview [https://perma.cc/339Y-FSXQ] (last visited
Nov. 21, 2021). Tencent is headquartered in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. About Us, TENCENT,
https://www.tencent.com/en-us/about.html#about-con-1
[https://perma.cc/A4QW-ZNYD] (last
visited Nov. 21, 2021). Baidu was founded on January 1, 2000, in Beijing. Our Company, BAIDU,
https://home.baidu.com/home/index/company [perma.cc/X6EM-449N] (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
Wangshen yu Beijing Guxiang Xinxi Jishu Youxian Gongsi deng Zhuzuoquan Quanshu Qinquan
Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu (it- 1 L'Kq f3 Jt ] 4A p5f R
t R$
A-'t) [Wang Shen v. Google Inc.], Beijing 01 Civ. 1321 Case No. 2011 (Beijing No.1 Interm.
People's Ct. Dec. 20, 2012), aff'd, Guge Gongsi yu Wangshen Qinhai Zhuzuoquan Jiufen'an (t
X TF{ db ±42F ) [Google Inc. v. Wang Shen], High Civ. 1221 Case No. 2013
T
-kE
(Beijing People's High Court Dec. 19, 2013). The decision by Beijing People's High Court was
selected by the PRC Supreme People's Court as one of the "2013 Top 10 Innovative Intellectual
Property Cases." Top 10 Innovative Intellectual Property Cases in Chinese Courts in 2013,
SUPREME
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Wang Shen v. Google Inc., supra note 228.
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232 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa (+

A %tA 9 R$Vti*
) [Civil Procedure
Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the National People's Congress, Apr. 9,
1991, amended by the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress, June 27, 2017)
P.R.C. Laws, Apr. 9, 2001, at art. 28, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/200712/12/content_1383880.htm [https://perma.cc/57CS-NV76 ] [hereinafter Database of Laws and
Regulations].
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fashengdi, Mi !atit). "Therefore, if any one of those places is in China,
Chinese courts have jurisdiction over the whole dispute."233
With the rapid increase in the online population, online
defamation is a rapidly developing area.234 On June 23, 2014, the Supreme
People's Court issued a guideline on online tortious cases, "Supreme
People's Court Rules on Several Issues in Tort Cases Related to
Personality Rights" (2014 SPC Rule). 235 Article 2 of this 2014 SPC Rule
renders a general norm in the context of online torts:
Actions based on allegations of online infringement of personality
rights may be brought to the people's court where the infringement
occurred, or where the defendant is domiciled.
The place where infringement occurred includes the place where
computer terminals involved in the alleged infringement is located; the
place where infringement results occurred includes the domicile of the
plaintiff.23 6

Since the 2014 SPC Rule, courts across the country have applied
the rule in deciding cases involving China's best known internet
companies. Baidu, China's search engine, is domiciled in Beijing, but it is
sued by plaintiffs all over the country in defamation cases. 237 In these
cases, Baidu typically challenges the jurisdiction of the local courts. It
argues that by virtue of Baidu being domiciled in Beijing, and the fact that
its servers are located in Beijing, only the local court in Beijing should

233

Wang Shen v. Google Inc., supra note 228.

234 See generally Yan Mei Ning, Internet Intermediary Liability in Online Defamation Lawsuits

The

Case ofMainland China, 11 J. COMP. L. 283 (2016) (analyzing online defamation cases in China);
Xin He & Fen Lin, The Losing Media? An Empirical Study of Defamation Litigation in China,
230 CHINA Q. 371 (2017) (surveying 524 defamation cases in China); Benjamin L. Liebman,
Innovation through Intimidation An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47
235

236
237

HARV. INT'L L.J. 33 (2006) (surveying 223 defamation cases in China).
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Liyong Xinxi Wangluo Qinhai Renshen Quanyi Minshi
Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Fall Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (- h
lxR
1t7JR p.
1 h
[Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on
'bef+A
M
In~lZ)
q +P Q
Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases involving Civil Disputes
over Infringements upon Personal Rights and Interests through Information Networks]
(promulgated by the Supreme People's Court, No. 11, June 23, 2014, effective Oct. 10, 2014)
[hereinafter 2014 SPC Rule].
Id. art. 2.
The case, infra note 238, was a ruling by the court in Shanghai. Courts in other areas ruled
similarly. For example, the Chongqing No.5 Intermediate People's Court in its decision (2019) 4&
05 C +u4 680 7 on June 17, 2019 affirmed the lower court's decision that it had jurisdiction over
Baidu in a defamation dispute. Another court, the Harbin Intermediate People's Court
(Heilongjiang province, Northern China) ruled in its decision (2019) ¾ 01 V u9 $- 275 7 on August
1, 2019, that the local district court had jurisdiction over Baidu in a defamation dispute.
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have jurisdiction. These challenges are typically dismissed. For example,
in Baidu v. Jiang Li,23 8 plaintiff Ms. Jiang Li, a resident in Shanghai's
Yangpu District, brought her online defamation complaint against Baidu
in Yangpu District Court. The trial court dismissed Baidu's challenge to
its jurisdiction, thus Baidu appealed to the Shanghai No.2 Intermediate
People's Court, the appellate court. The appellate court concluded:
[I]n this defamation dispute, the [general] rule is that local courts
where defendant is domiciled or [the] court of the place where
infringement occurred shall have jurisdiction. In online infringement
cases, the place where infringement occurred includes the place where
computers and other information processing equipment are located; the
place where infringement results occurred include the domicile of the
plaintiff who alleges the infringement. In this case, the plaintiff was a
resident in Shanghai Yangpu District, and the Yangpu District Court
had proper jurisdiction. The dismissal by the District Court on
jurisdiction was not an error. We hereby affirm. Baidu's reasons for
appeal are not substantiated, therefore [it] is dismissed. 23 9

In sum, China adopted a similar rule in embracing the "effect" theory, like
the courts in Japan, the European Union, and the Commonwealth
countries. By not requiring a "targeting" element to satisfy jurisdiction, all
the jurisdictions outside the United States diverge from it by making their
courts accessible to local internet users.
III. LIABILITY OF THE INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES

The second area of judicial divergence is the liability of digital
platforms or internet service providers (ISPs). In the United States, as has
been shown in Part I, the regulatory approach is one of broad immunity
under Section 230, characterized by a bright-line distinction between
"publisher" and "distributor." 2 40 By contrast, there is no such broad
immunity beyond the borders of the United States. In the United Kingdom
and other Commonwealth countries like Australia, and Hong Kong, a
theory of "innocent dissemination" offers some protection, like the
Directive on Electronic Commerce in the EU or a special statute in Japan
limiting the liability of ISPs. But all these countries in the Second Camp
keep tort liability by examining the behavior of the ISP rather than relying

[I4'M

238

Beijing Baidu Wangxun Keji Youxian Gongsi yu JiangLi Mingyuquan Jiufen Ershen Minshi
Caidingshu (AL2thh4&
02 Civ. 237 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People's Ct. Mar. 29, 2019).
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id.
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See discussion supratext accompanying notes 88-91.
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on its status. China adopts a similar tort liability approach, which allows
Chinese users to hold ISPs accountable.
A. COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

In the United Kingdom, the question of "publisher" was
considered in an internet defamation case in 1999, Godfrey v. Demon
InternetLtd.2 4 1 Here, defendant Demon Internet was an ISP that hosted an
online newsgroup that published postings by users. 2 42 The plaintiff, a
customer, found one posting defamatory and notified the Defendant.
Defendant acknowledged receipt of the notice but did not remove the
content until after the posting expired. 2 43 The legal issue was focused on
whether the defendant was a publisher or not. Judge Morland, writing for
the English High Court, stated:
After the 17th January 1997 after receipt of the Plaintiff's fax the
Defendants knew of the defamatory posting but chose not to remove it
from their Usenet news servers. In my judgment this places the
Defendants in an insuperable difficulty so that they cannot avail
themselves of the defense provided by [law].244

Judge Morland continued:
At Common Law liability for the publication of defamatory material
was strict. There was still publication even if the publisher was
ignorant of the defamatory material within the document. Once
publication was established the publisher was guilty of publishing the
libel unless he could establish, and the onus was upon him, that he was
an innocent disseminator. 245

Judge Morland surveyed American cases and quoted Cubby, Stratton
Oakmont, and Zeran in great detail. He noted: "[i]n my judgment the
English 1996 Act did not adopt this approach or have this purpose."2 46
The second case was Bunt v. Tilley. 247 Judge Eady, after
considering Godfrey, was not sure that Godfrey could be applied directly.

241
242

Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd [2000] 3 WLR 1020 (QB) (Morland J.) (Eng.).
Id para. 11.

243

id

244

Id para. 20.
Id para. 26.
Id para. 45.
Bunt v. Tilley [2006] EWHC (QB) 407, [2007] 1 WLR 1243 (Eng.). See also Grant v. Google UK
Ltd. [2005] EWHC (Ch) 3444; Jameel (Yousef) v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 75,
[2005] 2 WLR 1614 (UK).

245
246
247
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The judge was reasoning along the line of the "innocent dissemination"
doctrine when he commented:
What was left open for later consideration was how a court in England
should approach a situation where, by contrast with the factual
situation in Mr. Godfrey's case, an ISP had truly fulfilled no more than
a passive role as owner of an electronic device through which
defamatory postings were transmitted.2 4

Judge Eady continued:
[F]or a person to be held responsible there must be knowing
involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words. It is
not enough that a person merely plays a passive instrumental role in
the process.2 49

Judge Eady applied the same rule in Metropolitan InternationalSchools
Ltd. v. DesigntechnicaCorp.250 In the lower court, Judge Eady applied the
same rule in Tamiz v. Google.25 1
On appeal, however, the English Court of Appeal showed a
different assessment in its ruling in 2013.252 Lord Justice Richards stated
that it was wrong for the trial judge to regard Google's role "as a purely
passive one." 25 3 The Lord Justice clarified that the doctrine of "innocent
dissemination" was conditioned by the fact that the publisher did not know
the publication was defamatory. But notification changed that condition.
The Lord Justice stated:
[I]f Google Inc allows defamatory material to remain on a Blogger
blog after it has been notified of the presence of that material, it might
be inferred to have associated itself with, or to have made itself

248

249

251

Bunt, [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), para. 14. The doctrine of "innocent dissemination" was first
articulated in Emmens v. Pottle, (1885) 16 QBD 354, 357 (Eng.), where Lord Esher, M.R. ruled
that a vendor who sold newspapers that contained libel in it was not liable if he can prove that he,
as a "innocent disseminator," did not know that it contained a libel. In Vizetelly v. Mudie 's Select
Library Ltd., [1900] 2 QB 170 (Eng.), the Court of Appeal, relying on Emmens, ruled that
proprietors of a circulating library who circulated and sold a book that contained a libel was liable
because they were not able to prove they did not know the libel. RACHAEL MULHERON, PRINCIPLES
OF TORT LAW 808-09 (2nd ed. 2020).
Bunt, [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), para. 23.

Metro. Int'l Schs. Ltd. v. Designtechnica Corp. [2009] EWHC (QB) 1765, [2011] WLR 1743
(Eady J) (Eng.).

251

Tamiz v. Google Inc. [2012] EWHC (QB) 449 (Eady J) (Eng.).

252 Tamiz v. Google Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68, [2013] 1 WLR 2151 (Eng.).
253

Id. para. 23.
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responsible for, the continued presence of that material on the blog and
thereby to have become a publisher of the material. 2 4

The Court of Appeal's position might have been stimulated by
Judge Parkes in his decision in Davison v. Habeeb,255 a case decided three
months prior to Judge Eady's ruling in Tamiz. The 2011 case is quite
similar to Tamiz. Here, Google, as one of the defendants, was brought to
the court for defamatory postings on its platform Blogger.com. Google
was represented by Antony White, 256 the same counsel who had
represented Google in Metropolitan,making similar arguments. But Judge
Parkes differed from Judge Eady on the assessment of Google's role:
"Eady J.'s observations in Bunt v. Tilley about the need for a mental
element were made in the context of ISPs which were no more than passive
conduits which connected one person or one computer with another." 257
Judge Parkes pointed out, "[i]n the present case," however, Google
"provides and hosts a platform which is designed to enable users to publish
what (within limits) they wish by making their material available for others
to access and download." 2 58
To make the point clearer, Judge Parkes highlighted an additional
element: "Moreover, [Google] appears to assume a degree of
responsibility for what is published on its Blogger.com platform. . . . The
ability to remove offending words is plainly a highly relevant factor."259
A few lines later, Judge Parkes repeated this:
I do not think that the voluntary removal of some articles pending the
outcome of the proceedings establishes that [Google] is in any sense
the editor of the material, but I do accept that the ability to take down
offensive material is a relevant factor in determining whether it is a
publisher.260

In Hong Kong, the Court of Final Appeal, the highest judicial authority in
Hong Kong, reached the same conclusion in OrientalPress v. Fevaworks
Solutions.2 61
In Australia, a series of cases were filed against Yahoo and Google
between 2010 and 2012. In February 2010, Milorad Trkulja, a resident of

254

Id para. 34.

255 Davison v. Habeeb & Ors [2011] EWHC (QB) 3031 (Parkes J) (Eng.).
256 Id para. 3.
257 Id para. 39.
258 Id
259 Id

261 Id para. 40.
261 Oriental Press Grp. Ltd. v. Fevaworks Sols. Ltd., [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 366 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
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Victoria, brought suit against Google. 2 62 After some procedural issues in
2010 and 2011,263 the legal issue focused on the question of whether
Google was a "publisher." 2 64 Google's defense was that it was not a
publisher because it had no knowledge of the defamatory statements. 2 65 In
addition, Google argued there should be "immunity" for an internet search
engine.266 On appeal, the Court of Appeals in Victoria (VSCA) reversed
and ruled in favor of Google. 267 The High Court of Australia (HCA),
however, endorsed the trial court's opinion that "it is strongly arguable
that Google's intentional participation in the communication of the
allegedly defamatory results of Google search engine users supports a
finding that Google published the allegedly defamatory results." 26 8 It also
corrected the VSCA by making it clear that the plaintiff, in the pleading
stage, was not required to plead the degree of Google's involvement in the
publication "for the reason that all degrees of participation in the
publication are publication. "269 The HCA did not discuss the issue of
immunity. This is most likely because the issue was not appealed. It is
notable that both the trial court and VSCA rejected the notion. The VSCA,
in its decision in favor of Google, stated:

Trkulja v Google Inc LLC [No. 1] [2010] VSC 226 (27 May 2010) (Austl.). During
this period,
similar complaints against Google were brought to the courts in New South Wales and South
Australia. See Bleyer v Google Inc [2014] NSWSC 897 (12 August 2014); Duffy v. Google Inc
[2015] SASC 170 (27 October 2015); Google Inc v Duffy (2017) 129 SASR 304 (Austl.).
263 Trkulja v Google Inc [No. 2] [2010] VSC 490 (3 November 2010), ¶ 17; Trkulja v Google Inc [No.
3] [2011] VSC 503 (5 October 2011), ¶ 6; Trkulja v Google Inc [No. 4] [2011] VSC 560 (3
November 2011), ¶¶ 2-3.
264 Trkulja v Google Inc [No. 5] [2011] VSC 560 (12 November 2012), ¶¶ 16-18; Trkuja v Google
Inc [No. 6] [2015] VSC 635 (17 November 2015).
262

265 Trkulja [No. 5], [2011] VSC,
266 Trkulja [No. 6], [2015] VSC,
267
268
269

¶ 15.
¶ 72.

Google Inc v Trkulja [No. 7] (2016) 342 ALR 504,

¶ 415

(Austl.).

Trkulja v Google LLC [No.8] [2018] HCA 25 (13 June 2018), ¶ 38 (Austl.).
Id ¶ 40. In a more recent case, FairfaxMedia Publicationsv. Voller, the court was facing a similar

issue-whether defendants who had public Facebook page containing defamatory content created
by third-party users were publishers. [2021] HCA 27 (Sept. 8, 2021). Justices Gageler and Gordon,
who were among the majority of High Court of Australia in this case, stated:
[T]he word "intentionally" ... should be understood to be directed at an intention to
facilitate, or provide a platform for, communication of the allegedly defamatory matter.
Enough for participation in a process that is in fact directed to making matter available
for comprehension by a third party to be characterized as intentional is that the
participation in the process is active and voluntary. That is irrespective of the degree of
active and voluntary participation in the process. And it is irrespective of knowledge or
intention on the part of the participant as to the defamatory content of the matter
published.
Id ¶66.
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The legislation [in America] has produced, on occasion, an unhappy
result: Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc. The American experience

suggests that the content in any Australian legislation would require
much thought. But one thing, in our opinion, is clear. If there is to be
any immunity in favor of a search engine from liability for defamation,
it must be conferred by legislation." 0

In sum, courts in the Commonwealth countries have universally rejected
the notion of general immunity, but rather followed traditional common
law in torts by adopting a negligence standard. Despite the efforts of
Google and other American corporations, who have repeatedly urged them
to adopt Section 230 immunity, these courts did not find it convincing, nor
the power to do so.
B. EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union legal framework in the Directive on
Electronic Commerce 27 1 is built upon traditional tort law. The Directive
was largely formulated in late 1998,272 deliberation ensued early in 1999,
and it was passed by the European Parliament in June 2000.273 Its
immediate background was a series of cases on the question of liability of
ISPs. In England, litigation of the Godfrey v. Demon JnternetLtd. case was
still ongoing from early 1997 to March 1999.274 In Germany, Mr. Felix
Somm, director of the CompuServe Deutschland GmbH, the German
subsidiary of CompuServe, was going through a criminal trial for the
company's inadequate efforts to block pornography. 275 In May 1998, a
Munich criminal court sentenced Somm to two years of imprisonment. 276
In France, on April 10, 2000, less than two months before the adoption of
the Directive, LICRA, a French non-profit organization filed a complaint

270
271

Trkulja [No. 7], 342 ALR,

¶ 414.

See generallyDirective2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in
the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178/1) (establishing a
framework on electronic commerce).

272 Commission Proposalfora EuropeanParliamentand Council Directive on CertainLegalAspects
273

274

of Electronic Commerce in the InternalMarket, COM (1998) 586 final (Nov. 18, 1998).
See Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Promotingthe Information Society The EU Directive on

Electronic Commerce, 6 EUR. L.J. 363, 367-68 (2000).
See Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. [1999] EWHC 244, [2001] QB 201 (Morland J) (UK).

275 See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Monitoring and Blocking Illegal Content on the Internet-A German and
ComparativeLaw Perspective, 41 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 55, 76 (1998); Lothar Determann, The
New German InternetLaw, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 113, 120 (1998).
276 See Ladeur, supra note 275; Determann, supra note 275.
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against Yahoo and Yahoo France at the Superior Court of Paris. 277 These
cases showed how urgent the issue was for the European Union to
formulate the legal framework; both the Godfrey case and the American
statute, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, 278
pointed in the direction of the reform they needed.
On ISP liability, there was nothing like CDA Section 230 in the
European Union; rather, the Directive on Electronic Commerce adopted a
soft safe-harbor notion. It imagined three categories of ISP functions:
"mere conduit" under Article 12,279 "caching" under Article 13,280 and
"hosting" under Article 14.281 In general, an ISP is not liable for the
information transmitted, stored, or posted by a third-party user if the ISP
does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information, or if the
ISP "upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the information." 282 Consistent with the
notion of safe harbor, there is no general obligation for ISPs to monitor
activities on their websites under Article 15.283 Therefore, the Directive
resembles the English approach, a tort-based approach, and in treating all
torts-defamation, copyrights, trademarks, etc.-alike.
There are a small number of defamation cases based on Article 12,
including the case of Sotiris Papasavvas.2 84 Here the CJEU clarified that
. . . the limitations of civil liability specified in Articles 12 to 14 of
Directive 2000/13 do not apply to the case of a newspaper publishing
company which operates a website on which the online version of a
newspaper is posted . .. since it has knowledge of the information
posted and exercises control over that information, whether or not
2 5
access to that website is free of charge.

277

See Marc H. Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput The LICRA v. Yahoo Case and the Regulation of
Online Content in the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1191, 1192 (2003); Xavier Amadei,
Note, Standardsof Liabilityfor Internet Service Providers A ComparativeStudy of France and

the United States with a Specific Focus on Copyright, Defamation, and Illicit Content, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 220 (2001).

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28,
1998) (DMCA). Section 202 of the DMCA amended the Copyrights Act by adding Section 512,
which provides the notice and takedown rule, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2020).
279 Council Directive 2000/31, art. 12 2000 0.J. (L 178) 12, 13.
280 Id art. 13.
281 Id art. 14.
278

282 Id

283 Id. art. 15.
284
285

Case C-291/13, Papasavvas v.
(Sep. 11, 2014).
Id. ¶ 46.

O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia

Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209,
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Also,

the exemptions from liability established in that directive cover only
cases in which the activity of the information society service provider
is of a merely technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies
that that service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the
information which is transmitted or stored (citation omitted). 286

The trademark case in Google v. Louis Vuitton28 7 was on Google's
"AdWords" referring service and the sponsored links in its search results.
Louis Vuitton, owner of the luxury goods trademark, learned in 2003 that
a search of its trademarks on Google triggered the display of "sponsored
links" leading to websites offering imitation versions of Vuitton's
products. 288 In February 2005, a Regional Court in Paris found Google
liable, and the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Paris in June
2006. The French Supreme Court ("Cour de cassation") referred the issue
to the CJEU. The CJEU found that the internet referencing service
provider did not "use" the trademarks in the course of trade, 289 and thus
cannot be held liable for directly infringing upon the trademarks.
Therefore, the question became whether Google is liable for storing
advertisers' information, or whether Article 14 is broad enough to exempt
it.290

The CJEU had no doubt that Google's referring service satisfied
the definition of "information society service," 29 1but that was only the
beginning of the inquiry. The key for the CJEU is Google's conduct:
In order for the storage by a referencing service provider to come
within the scope of Article 14 of Directive 2000/13, it is . . necessary
that the conduct of that service provider should be limited to that of an
"intermediary service provider" within the meaning intended by the
legislature. . . 292

For this purpose, the CJEU continued, "it is necessary to examine whether
the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its

286 Id

¶ 40.

Joined Cases C-236/08 & C-238/08, Google France S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010
E.C.R. I-2467.
288 Id ¶23.
289 Google France, 2010 E.C.R., ¶ 58. The CJEU found that the advertisers
who purchased Google's
"AdWords" function to create sponsored links used the trademarks, and thus the trademarks
proprietor was entitled to prohibit such use. Id. ¶¶ 72, 79, 99.
290 Id ¶ 106.
287

291 See id. ¶ 110.
292 Id ¶ 112.
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conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of
knowledge or control of the data which it stores."2 93 The CJEU decided to
leave the national courts to assess the facts, 294 but the general rule here is
unmistakable:
Article 14 of Directive 2000/13 must be interpreted as meaning that
the rule laid down therein applies to an internet referencing service
provider in the case where that service provider has not played an
active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over,
the data stored.29 5

In the subsequent L 'Oreal v. eBay case, 296 the CJEU followed Google v.
Louis Vuitton closely. The question, whether eBay is protected by Article
14 of Directive 2000/13, depends on the role that eBay played:
Where . . the operator has provided assistance which entails, in
particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question
or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to have taken a
neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential
buyers but to have played an active role of such a kind as to give it
knowledge of, or control over, the data relating to those offers for sale.
It cannot then rely, in the case of those data, on the exemption from
liability referred to in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31.297

In sum, the CJEU has consistently adopted a negligence standard in
examining the conducts of ISPs and deciding liabilities, a clear contrast
with the general immunity reflected in Section 230 of the CDA in the
United States.
C. JAPAN

Japan's law on internet intermediary liability resembles that in the
European Union. Better, it codified the norms in a separate statute. In
November 2001, Japan enacted a law limiting civil liabilities of
telecommunication service providers, known as the Provider Liability
Limitation Act (ni'
h'Wi, PLLA), Act No. 137 of 2001.298 Like

293 Id

294 Id
295 Id
296

See Case C-324/09, L'Oreal SA v. eBay Int'l AG, ECLIEU:C:2011:474, ¶ 145 (July 12, 2011).
¶ 116.
Jouhou No Kaiji Nikansuru Hritsu [Act on the Limitation of Liability for Damages of Specified
Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to Demand Disclosure of Identification

297 Id
298

¶ 114.
¶ 119.
¶ 120.

'
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Section 230 of CDA in the United States, the PLLA provides general
immunity to service providers. Article 3 of the Act provides that service
providers, when they are not the creator of the content, "shall not be liable
for any loss incurred from infringement. "299 The PLLA, however, departs
from CDA Section 230; it resembles the EU's Directive on Electronic
Commerce in adopting a tort approach by creating exceptions to general
immunity. Under Article 3, exceptions are under two conditions: (1) it is
technically possible to prevent transmission of such information, and (2)
there is knowledge of such infringement. 300 Exceptions to general
immunity apply if the service provider had had actual knowledge of the
infringement or had adequate reasons to believe it caused such
infringement.3 0

PLLA aimed to address issues emerging from judicial decisions
prior to its enactment. One such issue is reflected in the Nifty Forum case
by the Tokyo High Court, decided in September 2001. 302 In this
defamation case, Nifty, a major ISP in Japan, operated a number of bulletin
boards. One of the bulletin boards was "Modern Thought Forum,"
operated by Defendant B, a contractor called a sysop (vim -<Z) (system
operator) in Japan.303 The sysop had the power to remove contents from
the bulletin board. Plaintiff, a member of the Forum, learned about
negative messages about her from her friends and notified the sysop by
email to remove the defamatory contents, but the sysop refused. 304 The
Tokyo District Court ruled in 1997 (before PLLA's enactment) that the
sysop, as manager of Forum, is responsible for its smooth operation and
owed a duty of care when notified of defamatory statements. 305 On appeal,

Information of the Senders], Act No. 137 of 2001, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT
DS]),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp
(Japan)
[https://perma.cc/2Q4Q-UELQ]
[hereinafter Provider Liability Limitation Act]. See generally MASAO YANAGA, CYBER LAW IN
JAPAN 199-200 (4th ed. 2020); Yoshihisa Hayakawa, Japanese Law in the Era of the Internet
The New and Coming Legislation in Japan, 45 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 61, 69-71 (2002).
299
300

Provider Liability Limitation Act, art. 3.

301

Id.

302

Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] Sept. 5, 2001, Heisei 9 (ne) No. 2631,
2633, 2668,
5632, 1088 Hanrei Taimuzu [Hanta] 94 (Japan), appealed from, Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo
Dist. Ct.] May 26, 1997, Heisei 6 (ne) 7784, 24828, 1610 Hanrei Jiho [Hanji] 22 (Japan)
[hereinafter Nifty Forum]. See generally Hiroko Onishi, The Online Defamation Maze Are We
Finding a Way Out?, 27 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 200, 203-04 (2013) (commenting on
the Nifty Forum case); MASAO, supra note 298, at 197.

Id.

303 Onishi, supra note 302, at 203.
304

Id.
305 1610 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 22.
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the Tokyo High Court rejected this duty to remove defamatory statements.
The High Court considered the sysop's power of removal based on the
operation contract with the ISP; while it has the power of removal, it
should also have the autonomy in making its decision based on its own
assessments. The High Court ruled that the sysop did not breach its duty
to remove the contents. 306
PLLA was passed on November 30, 2001, a few months after the
Tokyo High Court's decision. 307 The Japanese Diet, by contrast, did not
adopt the high bar that the Tokyo High Court used in Nifty Forum. Instead,
it gave some control to users by creating exceptions based on the
knowledge of the ISP, namely, a negligence standard in Article 3.308 In the
2 Channel case, 309 the Tokyo High Court clearly followed the framework
that PLLA sets. Here, the plaintiff was an animal hospital that found
defamatory statements in the bulletin board operated by the defendant.
Plaintiff notified the sysop, who refused to remove the defamatory
statements because the latter did not think defamation was established. The
Tokyo District Court, applying the newly enacted PLLA, found
defamation was established and thus found the sysop liable for its failure
to remove the content after notification. 310 The Tokyo High Court affirmed
the decision. It also took the opportunity to clarify that a sysop's
assessment of defamation should follow an assessment based on an
"ordinary person's reading" (-VAOaI
i).
In doing so, the Tokyo
High Court departed from its more deferential position to the ISPs.

306 Nifty Forum, supra note

302.

307 Provider Liability Limitation Act, supra note 298.
3

Id art. 3.

309 Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] Dec. 25, 2002, Heisei 14 (ne) No. 4083, 50 KOTO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [K MIN] (No. 3) 15; 1816 Hanrei jiho [Hanji] 52 (Japan).

"

Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jun. 26, 2002, Heisei 13 (wa) No.15125, SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI

JOHO [SAIBANSHOWEB],

[https://perma.cc/7ZF8-7KYV].
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Prior to the Civil Code, 31 ' the legal framework for liability of
internet intermediaries in China was set by Tort Liability Law (2009).312
Like the European Union, China adopted a fault-based tort liability for
online infringement of civil rights. Article 36 provides:
Internet users and Internet service providers (ISPs) shall bear tort
liability if they utilize the Internet to infringe upon the civil rights of
others.
If an Internet user commits a tort through Internet services, the
infringed shall be entitled to inform the ISP to take necessary
measures, including, inter alia, deletion, blocking and disconnection.
If the ISP fails to take necessary measures in a timely manner upon
notification, it shall be jointly and severally liable with the said Internet
user for the extended damage.
If an ISP is aware that an Internet user is infringing on the civil rights
and interests of others through its Internet services and fails to take
necessary measures, it shall be jointly and severally liable with said
Internet user for such infringement.313

Article 36 is largely based on the "note and takedown" in the
United States Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 314 and
notification doctrine is widely applied in online copyright and trademark
infringement cases in China.315 In the defamation realm, Zhang Qin v.
China.com, was a case decided by Beijing Chaoyang District People's

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfadian (+ k A j 19 F i'1) (Civil Code of the People's
Republic of China) (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., May 28, 2020, effective Jan. 1,
2021), STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 2 (2020, Special Issue), translated in
Database of Laws and Regulations, http://www.npc.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/VDH4-CZJP].
2 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo QinquanZeren Fa (+tkAM&
M -WtTflt)
(Tort Liability Law
of the People's Republic of China) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010, repealed January 1, 2021 by Article 1260 of the Civil Code,
id), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y8F7-9T8F],
translated in Database of Laws and Regulations, http://www.npc.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/4RNWGGLT].
3 Id art. 36. The substance of Article 36 is now provided in Articles 1194 and 1195 of the Civil
Code, supra note 311.
314 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), supra note 278. The connection between
Article 36 and DMCA was acknowledged in tdt
[Zhang Xinbao] and 4f-iPFW [Ren Hongyan],
HT h ± +iRt{ _41: t i ({itRT (hI)) M36 MI6 it [ Tort Liability on the Web An Interpretationof
Article 36 of Tort Liability Law], + K
17, 21 (2010, No.4).
315 )Aiel:
[Zhou Xuefeng] &
'T [Li Ping],
x ` 'tfii-I
ftEi [THE GOVERNANCE AND
311

AV -''t

[JOURNAL OF RENMIN UNIVERSITY OF CHINA]

LIABILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARY] 354, 35-69 (Beijing: 2018).
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Court, 316 and affirmed on appeal by the Beijing No.3 Intermediate
People's Court.3 17 The defendant was Huawang Huitong (+rH vr ), owner
and operator of China.com, one of the earliest internet portals in China.318
Plaintiff, a corporate executive of Sinopec Group, China's state-owned oil
company, found defamatory messages targeting her on the bulletin board
of China.com in 2003. She notified China.com on March 8, 2013, but
heard nothing from them by March 15 of the same year when the plaintiff
filed her complaint in court. During trial, the two sides did not dispute that
the defamatory messages were composed and posted by third-party users;
what was in question was whether the plaintiff had properly sent the
notification to the defendant or not. The trial court had no difficulty
dismissing the defendant's claims of no notification and found that the
plaintiff had notified the defendant of the defamatory messages, but the
defendant had failed to remove them in a timely manner. The district court
announced:
In accordance with the Article 36(2) of the Tort Law of the People's
Republic of China, China.com is, together with the author of the
messages, jointly and severally liable for the extended damage,
namely, the damage caused from the date of plaintiff's notification to
the date of removal.319

It is important to note that the Tort Law does not define "timely" removal
nor "extended damage." In a code-based legal system like China's, this is
where judicial discretion is exercised, and policy considerations are taken
into account. In the China.com case, the District Court decided that one
week after notification was enough to rule against the ISP.320

316

317

318

Zhang Qin Yu Beijing Huawang Huitong Jishu Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Mingyu Quan Jiufen
Yishen Panjue Shu (5V L,4P1L' 13 !kt: t flh Rev
t t h1 '*g$#'i+)zt) [Zhang Qin
v. China.com, Judgment of First Instance Court on A Dispute over Right of Reputation], China
[https://perma.cc/XD82-SB4K]
(Beijing
Judgments Online, https://wenshu.court.gov.cn
Chaoyang Dist. People's Ct., Oct. 23, 2013).
Beijing Huawang Huitong Jishu Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhang Qin Mingyu Quan Jiufen Ershen
Panjue Shu (iLt%s t 13 f!t3 R -%+T hr 5 t '4i $'i1+ )t) [Zhang Qin v.
China.com, Judgment of Second Instance Court on A Dispute over Right of Reputation], China
Judgments Online, https://wenshu.court.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/ZQ7G-3KLK] (Beijing No.3
Interm. People's Ct., Mar. 31, 2014).
China com
was
founded in May
1999,
according to
its own
website,
https://www.china.com/zhcn/general/about.html [https://perma.cc/EXS8-2X7R]. In July 1999, it
became the first Chinese Internet business to be listed on NASDAQ in the United States. ZIxUE
TAI, THE INTERNET IN CHINA: CYBERSPACE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 139 (2007).

319 Zhang Qin v. China.com, supra note 317.
320

Id.
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In a more recent defamation case against zhihu.com (rl±),321 a
well-known blog in China, the Shanghai Xuhui District People's Court
considered "timely" removal. Here, the plaintiff was a professor at
Nanjing University who had his lawyer send zhihu.com a take-down
notice after learning about defamatory messages posted on zhihu.com by
third-party users. 322 The lawyer's letter was sent on June 12, 2019.
Defendant removed one offensive message and subsequent comments by
July 5, 2019. The trial court considered the removal timely, and that the
defendant had met the "reasonable expectation" for ISPs.32 3 With respect
to another offensive message, however, defendant did not remove the
offensive content until July 29, 2019, when the court proceedings had
started. The trial court ruled that "defendant's action is beyond an ordinary
person's reasonable expectation of 'timely removal,' thus defendant failed
to take measures in timely manner."3 24
In sum, courts in Commonwealth countries, the European Union,
Japan, and China universally adopt tort law negligence standard in
deciding liability of internet intermediaries, despite their differences in
legal traditions (common law vs. civil law), and political ideology (liberal
democracy vs. authoritarianism).
IV. RISE OF GLOBAL INJUNCTION

The last area of judicial divergence is remedy. There cannot be a
better factual pattern than that in Hassell v. Bird,3 2 5 a recent California
Supreme Court decision. The plaintiffs were attorneys who alleged
defamatory content in consumer reviews posted on Yelp, which they
suspected were authored by a former client. 32 6 They filed a lawsuit against
the former client; the defendant did not appear in hearings, so the plaintiffs
won a default judgment from the trial court. The trial court ordered the

321

Long Yitao Yu Beijing Zhizhe Tianxia Keji Youxian Gongsi Mingyu Quan Jiufen Yishen Minshi
Panjue Shu (IM t- -Ltt-FTfk
R4> R t%%17 t++ q b $#iz i) [Long Yitao v.
Zhihu.com, Judgment of First Instance Court on A Dispute over Right of Reputation], Tianyan
Cha (https://susong.tianyancha.com) (Shanghai Xuhui Dist. People's Ct., 2019), aff'd, Beijing
Zhizhe Tianxia Yu Long Yitao Mingyu Quan Jiufen Ershen Panjue Shu (iLt-tF
IMt
t+Rfit_*P$#i ,j) [Long Yitao v. Zhihu.com, Judgment of Second Instance Court on A
Dispute over Right of Reputation] (Shanghai No.1 Interm. People's Ct., July 26, 2020).

322 id.
323 id.
324 id.

325 Hassell
326 Id

v. Bird,

at 780.

420 P.3d 776, 778 (Cal. 2018).
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defendant to remove defamatory reviews from Yelp.com. Because the
court was not sure where the defendant was located, it also stated that
"Yelp.com is ordered to remove all reviews posted by [defendant] ."327 Can
a court issue an order on Yelp? The California Supreme Court ruled that
Yelp is protected by Section 230 because the trial court's order essentially
treated Yelp as a publisher.3 28
This Part analyzes similar cases litigated in courts in
Commonwealth countries (United Kingdom and Canada), the EU, and
Japan. In the U.K., a doctrine called Norwich Pharmacal created such a
duty on an innocent third party, and now this doctrine has been applied to
the internet. In the EU, the CEJU is more open to the idea of letting the
court issue orders to ISPs which have an effect worldwide. Even Japan, in
a recent case regarding Twitter by the Supreme Court of Japan, opens the
possibility. China does not have judicial decisions on this issue yet. But
China is actively exploring the idea of projecting its own judicial power
beyond its borders. As a result, the U.S. digital platforms are increasingly
facing the rise of global injunctions.
A. COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

In the nineteenth-century, an English court's power to issue
injunction orders to a foreign corporation is fairly limited: the general rule
is that an injunction would not be granted against a person who is not
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless there is something to be done
within the jurisdiction.329 In order for a court to issue a global injunction
order to an ISP, two barriers have to be overcome: the first is that an
innocent third-party cannot be issued an injunction order; the second is
that a non-resident innocent third-party is out of reach by the court. In the
1970s, the English court was breaking the first barrier. In 1973, the House
of Lords ruled in the Norwich Pharmacal case that an innocent person may
come under a duty to assist the injured person. 330 Here, patent owners and
327 Id at 781.
328 Id
at 790, 792.
329 FRANCIS TAYLOR PIGGOTT, SERVICE OUT OF THE JURISDICTION 31-36 (London, William Clowes

& Sons, Ltd. 1892). However, this seemed still less rigid than the United States Supreme Court
decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Edward Q. Keasbey observed in 1905 that the
English courts "of recent years have made an important departure" from the traditional rule that
focused on service of process. Edward Q. Keasbey, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents in Personal
Actions, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 440 (1905).
m Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Comm'rs [1974] AC 133 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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licensees in England found that their patent was infringed by the illicit
importation of goods manufactured abroad. 33 ' However, they did not
know who imported the illicit goods. They sought an injunction to the
Commissioners of Customs and Excise for disclosure of the information.
It was in this context that the House of Lords recognized this unusual
doctrine of equity:
... if through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious
acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing he may incur no
personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who
has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the
identity of the wrongdoers.3 32

In the Age of the internet, this doctrine was quickly incorporated into
English cyberlaw. A direct application of the Norwich Pharmacaldoctrine
is to seek an order on the ISP for information.333 In 2011, the English High
Court applied the doctrine to copyright protection by issuing an injunction
order on British Telecommunications Plc.,33 4 the largest internet service
provider (ISP) in the U.K., to block certain websites that had infringed
upon copyrights. In 2018, the United Kingdom Supreme Court brought the
same doctrine to the area of trademarks. 335 Here, Swiss and German
companies who owned luxury goods trademarks such as Cartier sought
and obtained an injunction order from English courts against the UK's five
largest ISPs for the purpose of blocking certain websites that were selling
counterfeits. 336 In all these cases, ISPs, as the innocent third-party, have
become the vehicle for enforcing intellectual property rights.
With the ISPs frequently being dragged to courts, the second
barrier became less of a challenge. In September 2017, the New South
Wales Supreme Court in Australia issued a worldwide injunction order on
Twitter.33 7 In a more significant case in Canada, Equustek Solutions Inc.,

331

Id

at 137.

332 Id. at 175.

3

Golden Eye (Int'l) Ltd. v. Telefonica UK Ltd. [2012] EWCH (Ch) 723, [2012] RPC 698 (Eng.);
Golden Eye (Int'l) Ltd. v. Telefonica UK Ltd. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1740, [2013] RPC 452 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
"4 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecomms. Plc. [2011] EWCH (Ch) 1981, [2012]
All ER 806 (Eng.); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecomms. Plc. [2011] EWCH
(Ch) 2714, [2012] All ER 869 (Eng.).
"5 Cartier Int'l AG v. British Telecomms. Plc. [2018] UKSC 28, [2018] 1 WLR 3259 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
336 Id
337

Xv Twitter, Inc (2017) 95 NSWLR 301 (Austl.). For comments of the case, see Michael Douglas,
ExtraterritorialInjunctionsAffecting the Internet, 12 J. EQUITY 34 (2018).
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a British Columbia corporation, brought suit against Google Inc. and
Google Canada.338 The case began as a suit against a different company,
Datalink, for infringement of trade secrets, and Equustek obtained
numerous court orders, including a December 2012 order prohibiting
Datalink from carrying business through any website. 339 However,
Datalink continued selling the products in question in violation of court
orders.3 4 0 Following the December 2012 court order, Google, who was not
a party to the dispute, voluntarily complied with the plaintiff's request to
remove specific webpages or uniform resource locations ("URLs") from
its Google.ca search results. 34' However, Google was unwilling to block
an entire category of URLs ("mother sites") from its search results
worldwide. 342 Equustek sought a worldwide interim injunction order
against Google, a non-party to its case against Datalink. 343 In June 2014,
the trial court ruled in favor of Equustek and granted an interim
injunction. 344 The ruling was affirmed in July 2014 by the Court of Appeal
of British Columbia.3 45 In December 2017, the Canadian Supreme Court,
by a majority of seven to two, dismissed the appeal and upheld the
worldwide interlocutory injunction against Google. 346
Emphasizing that interlocutory injunction is an equitable remedy,
and thus a matter of discretion for the trial court,347 the Supreme Court of
Canada followed a three-part test in analyzing the question, asking: first,
whether there is a serious issue to be tried; second, would the person
applying for the injunction suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were
not granted; and third, whether the balance of convenience favors granting
the injunction or denying it.3 48 The first part was not in dispute. 349 On the
second part, Google did not dispute that Equustek may suffer irreparable
harm but contended that a non-party should be immune from the

338

Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 2017 SCC 34, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.).

339 Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063 (Can.) (B.C.).

340 Id
341

para 7.
Id para 9.

342

id

343 Id para. 10.
344 Id para. 161.
345 Equustek Sols.
346

Inc. v. Google Inc., 2014 BCCA 295 (Can.) (B.C.); Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Google
Inc., 2014 BCCA 448 (Can.) (B.C.); Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Jack, 2015 BCCA 265 (Can.).
Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 2017 SCC 34, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.).

347

Id para. 23.

348

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, para. 40 (Can.).

349 Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 2017 SCC 34, para. 26, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.).
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injunction. 350 Here, the majority's answer was rather simple: Google's
claim is "contrary to the jurisprudence." 35' The majority cited case law to
clarify that "[t]he non-party's obligation arises 'not because [it] is bound
by the injunction by being a party to the cause, but because [it] is
conducting [itself] so as to obstruct the course ofjustice."'3 5 2 The majority
declared, "where a non-party violates a court order, there is a principled
basis for treating the non-party as if it had been bound by the order." 35 3
This is out of pragmatism, as "the interlocutory injunction in this case
flows from the necessity of Google's assistance in order to prevent the
facilitation of Datalink's ability to defy court orders and do irreparable
harm to Equustek. Without the injunctive relief, it was clear that Google
would continue to facilitate that ongoing harm."354
To the third part, the balance of convenience, Google contended
that the global reach of the injunctive relief violates international
comity. 355 The majority considered this only "theoretical." 356 Here, the
Supreme Court quoted and fully endorsed what Madam Justice Fenlon, the
trial judge, stated in her opinion: "most countries will likely recognize
intellectual property rights and view the selling of pirated products as a
legal wrong." 357 It also quoted, and fully endorsed, Justice Groberman of
the Court of Appeal when the latter stated: "In the case before us, there is
no realistic assertion that the judge's order will offend the sensibilities of
any other nation." 358 In addition, the majority also noted that,
[t]he order does not require that Google take any steps around the
world, it requires it to take steps only where its search engine is
controlled. This is something Google has acknowledged it can doand does-with relative ease. There is therefore no harm to Google
which can be placed on its 'inconvenience' scale arising from the
global reach of the order.359

Two of the nine justices on the Supreme Court of Canada dissented. 360 The
dissenting justices called for judicial restraint. From the viewpoint of ISP
Id paras. 26-27.
Id para. 28.
352 Id para. 29 (citing MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048 (Can.)).
3 Id para. 29.
35 Id para. 35.
55 Id para. 44.
35

351

356

Id

351

Id para. 44 (quoting Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, para. 144 (Can.)).

35

Id. para. 45 (quoting Equustek Sots. Inc. v. Jack, 2015 BCSC 265, para. 93 (Can.)).

359Id para. 43.
361

Id paras. 55-82 (Cote and Rowe, JJ., dissenting).
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liability, two points they made are important to understand the majority's
position as well as anticipate the next move of the Court. First, the
dissenting justices continued Google's non-party claim and went further:
"In our view, Google did not aid or abet the doing of the prohibited act." 361
This is because, the dissenting opinion continued, "[t]he act prohibited by
the December 2012 Order is Datalink 'carrying on business through any
website.' That act occurs whenever Datalink launches websites to carry
out business-not when other parties, such as Google, make it known that
such websites exist." 362 Therefore, the dissenting opinion concluded that
"Google does not play a role in Datalink's breach of the December 2012
Order." 363
Second, the dissenting justices noted that an alternative remedy was
suggested by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia but was not
considered by the majority. 364 The lower court suggested Equustek pursue
a remedy in French court since Datalink has assets in France. "We see no
reason why Equustek cannot do what the Court of Appeal urged it to

do. "365
In sum, courts in the Commonwealth countries responded to the
internet by embracing and expanding the Norwich Pharmacaldoctrine.
This was based on the judicial power in equity, a common law tradition
not foreign to the United States. However, in the United States, Section
230-a federal statute-and other policy considerations precluded that
common law option.
B. EUROPEAN UNION

In the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) embraced the Equustek position, through its interpretation of the
EU law. Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 8 June 2000 provides guidance on certain legal

361 Id
362

363 Id
364 Id
365

para. 71.

Id para. 69.
para. 74.
para. 81.

Id para. 81. For commentaries of the case, see Robert Diab, Search Enginesand Global Takedown
Orders Google v Equustek and the Future of Free Speech Online, 56 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 231

(Winter 2019); Douglas, supra note 337.
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aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the internal market.3 66 Article 15(1) of that directive provides:
Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers,
when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to
monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general
obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal
activity.

In Glawischnig-Piesczekv. Facebook,367 the CJEU ruled in a defamation
case complained by Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek, an Austrian citizen, a
member of the Nationalrat (National Council, Austria), chair of the
parliamentary party ("the Green"), and spokesperson for that party. On
April 3, 2016, a Facebook user posted an article from an Austrian online
news magazine oe24.at accompanied by a comment, both considered
offensive and defamatory by Glawischnig-Piesczek. 368 On July 7, 2016,
Glawischnig-Piesczek sent a letter to Facebook Ireland requesting the
content be removed. Facebook did not remove the comment. 369 On
December 7, 2016, Glawischnig-Piesczek brought an action before the
Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria). 370 The trial
court in Vienna issued an interim order, directing Facebook Ireland to
cease and desist from publishing and/or disseminating the offensive
content. 371 Facebook Ireland complied with the order and blocked access
to the content in Austria.372 However, litigation continued, and eventually,
the case was appealed to Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of Austria).
Because the case raised questions on EU law, the Supreme Court of
Austria referred it to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on one question in
particular: whether an EU member can issue a worldwide injunction order
to remove the defamatory content. 373
The CJEU held that "Directive 2000/31 does not preclude those
injunction measures from producing effects worldwide." 374 The CJEU
366 Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal

367

Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal
Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13.
Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland, Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, (Oct. 3,
2019).

368 Id
369 Id
370

Id

371

Id

¶
¶

12.
14.

Id. ¶ 15.
373 Id ¶ 20.
374 Id ¶ 50.
372
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considered that "in view of the global dimension of electronic commerce,
the EU legislature considered it necessary to ensure that EU rules in that
area are consistent with the rules applicable at international level." 375
However, according to the CJEU, "[i]t is up to Member States to ensure
that the measures which they adopt and which produce effects worldwide
take due account of those rules." 376
In sum, the CJEU concluded in Glawischnig-Piesczek v.
Facebook that EU law is open to the idea of global injunction, similar to
the Commonwealth countries. 377 It is interesting to note that, in Google v.
CNIL, 378 the "right to be forgotten" case which was decided one week
earlier, the CJEU concluded that the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) did not require the "right to be forgotten" to be
enforced worldwide. 379 The different conclusions in the two cases likely
show that the CJEU carefully meted out its decision and left this position
open.
C. JAPAN

In Japan, the Provider Liability Limitation Act (PLLA) allows a
victim whose rights are infringed upon to apply for an order issued to the
service provider to release the content sender's name, address, and other
information prescribed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications. 380 In May 2002, the Ministry issued an ordinance
providing a list of information that may be disclosed under Article 4(1),381
including, name, address, email, IP address, mobile phone number, etc.
With the rise of social concerns with online defamation in Japan, Article
4(1) offers a possible pathway for aggravated parties to seek disclosure of

375 Id. ¶ 51.
376

Id ¶ 52.

377

Id

378 Case C-507/17, Google v. CNIL, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶¶ 63-64 (Sept. 24, 2019).
379 Id ¶65.
381 PROVIDER LIABILITY LIMITATION ACT art. 4(1) (Japan). For a summary in English, see MASAO
YANAGA, supra note 298, at 199.
38'

Tokutei Denki Tsnshin Ekimu Teikyosha No Songai Baisho Sekinin No Seigen Oyobi Hasshinsha
Joho No Kaiji Nikansuru Horitsu Dai Yon Jo Dai Ichi Ko No Hasshinsha Joho O Sadameru Shorei

-M A#f *
e 5t)
[Ministry Ordinance Based on Article 4(1) of Provider Liability
Limitation Act], Law No. 57 of 2002, (e-Gov Horei kensaku [Horei DB]), https://elaws.egov.go.jp/document?lawid=414M60000008057 [https://perma.cc/SC9E-6VBH] (Japan).
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information of the wrongdoers from ISPs in order to obtain remedy.3 8 2 So
far, the Supreme Court of Japan (SCJ) has made three decisions on Article
4(1). The first decision was in April 2010, when the SCJ ruled that the ISP
was the one who had the duty to disclose under Article 4(1).383 The second
case was decided one week later, when the SCJ ruled that ISP would be
liable for compensation for its failure to disclose. 3 84 The third case was
decided by SCJ in July 2020 in a copyright dispute against Twitter,385 the
American corporation based in Silicon Valley, California.
The plaintiff in Twitter was a copyright owner of a photograph,
with a copyright mark and his name; he posted the photograph on his
website in 2009.386 In 2015, without permission, a Twitter user copied the
photograph and used it in his or her tweet. 387 The photograph was
retweeted many times by other Twitter users. 388 When retweeted, Twitter
automatically resized the photos, so the copyright mark and owner's name
disappeared from the retweeted photos.38 9 The SCJ concluded that this
omission of the owner's name infringed upon the owner's moral rights

382 Japan maintains criminal libel law, and traditionally, criminal law was and still is frequently used

to deal with defamation cases. For example, Lawrence W. Beer observed in 1972, "As a matter of
doctrine, civil suit is the preferred remedy, except in extreme cases. However, in practice criminal
prosecution or recourse to the Civil Liberties Bureau are the usual avenues in Japan." Lawrence
W. Beer, Defamation, Privacy, andFreedom of Expression in Japan, 5 LAW IN JAPAN 192 (1972).
This observation is even truer in the age of the internet. Professor Sail K. Mehra showed that
criminal libel law use increased from 1994 to 2003, when the use of internet in Japan skyrocketed.
Salil K. Mehra, Post a Message and Go to Jail Criminalizing Internet Libel in Japan and the

United States, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2007). Recently, the Ministry of Justice has advocated
introducing more severe criminal penalties for the crime of insults (f47). See f@WR
&
A- [Imprisonment to be Introduced for Insult Crimes], H*
f M [JAPANESE ECON. NEWS],
Aug. 31, 2021, at 44. Civil remedy in defamation cases remains limited by American standards.

E lw

See Noriko Kitajima, The Protectionof Reputation in Japan A Systemic Analysis ofDefamation

383

Cases, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89 (Winter 2012). In this sense, Article 4(1) of PLLA is a step
forward in strengthening civil remedies in Japan.
Saikosaibansho Daiichisho Hotei [Supreme Court First Small Court] Apr. 8, 2010, Heisei 21 (kyo)
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available

at

https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanreijp/detail2?id=80104 [https://perma.cc/N7QT-4TBH].
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under the Copyright Act. 390 Therefore, under PLLA Article 4(1), the Court
affirmed the trial court's order to Twitter to disclose the identification
information of the user who has sent the initial tweet. 391
The Twitter ruling, explosive as it was, 392 was narrowly
formulated. The SCJ was largely focused on the statutory language of
PLLA Article 4(1) and the Copyright Act, 393 which is typical of the SCJ.
If the SCJ was concerned about policy issues, it is more likely that it was
driven by growing domestic concerns of defamation in cyberspace. Since
the SCJ's 2010 decisions, online abuse (4 P FNA9, netto chosho) has been
increasingly considered a serious social concern in Japan.394 In July 2011,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications publicized a study of
PLLA with suggestions. 395 In November 2013, the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations called for reform of PLLA. 396 In February 2020, the Cabinet
proposed, and the Diet (Japan's bicameral legislature) passed a new law,
the "Digital Platform Transparency Act." 3 97 Shortly before the SCJ's
an actress on a popular
decision, in May 2020, Hana Kimura (t*l),
reality TV show, died of suicide after receiving countless hostile online

390 id
391 id
392
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393 Only Justice Keiichi Hayashi's sole dissenting opinion noted the policy issue-the burden imposed
on the 45 million Twitter users in Japan. Twitter case, supra note 385.
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messages. 398 The Kimura tragedy became a powerful signal showing how
serious the problem of online abuse was. But concerns of the online world
were not limited to Japan's territory. In June 2020, the Diet passed
extensive amendments to the Act on Protection of Personal Information
(APPI). 399 One significant change in the 2020 amendments is that APPI is
now applicable inside as well as outside Japan's territory. 40 0 In this
context, the SCJ's ruling in Twitter, by affirming a trial court's order to an
American corporation based in California, seems to suggest an emerging
policy shift in Japan. At least, the SCJ puts itself in a potential position
like that of the Canadian Supreme Court in asserting global jurisdiction.
D. CHINA

China's judiciary has not issued any global injunction orders in
online cases as of November 2021. Traditionally, it has been constrained
by its own ideological and political factors. However, in recent years,
China's policymakers have reconsidered their position. This new direction
is indicated in a speech given by President Xi Jinping on February 25,
2019, where the President called on efforts to further "extraterritorial
application" (yuwai shiyong, tVk 6M) of Chinese law. 4
Leading scholars in China largely frame President Xi's new
direction with the reform of the Civil Procedure Code, especially on the
question of international jurisdiction of the Chinese courts. The Civil
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Personal Information], passed at the Diet of Japan on June 5, 2020, promulgated on June 12, 2020,
available
at
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[https://perma.cc/8QWQ-GW7D] [hereinafter APPI 2020 Amendment] (last accessed Aug. 20,
2021).
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Procedure Code, last amended in 2012,402 was based on an outdated and
conservative notion of territorial focus that has failed to notice China's
changed circumstances, including China's new status as a capitalexporting country with foreign investments all over the world. For others,
this is more than a practical concern of China's interests overseas, it is also
about China being a "great power" (daguo, mQ); thus, it should meet the
expectations of the "judiciary of a great power" (daguo sifa, p7 ).403
That means that China should be able to project judicial power outside its
own territory. The pressure China felt in the cases of Huawei, ZTE, and
the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's chief financial officer, prompted
intense interest in long-arm statutes in the United States. 40 4 The other
factor is China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), where China feels the
need to reach all countries at the receiving end of the BRI investments.
Think tanks and scholars are suggesting that China should have its own
long-arm statute.4 5
So far, the most significant development of this "extraterritorial
application" of Chinese law policy is unmistakably manifested in the
newly enacted Data Security Law (DSL). 406 Paragraph 2 of the Article 2
of the DSL prescribes: "Data handling activities carried out outside the
Chinese territory of the P.R.C. that harming the national security of the
P.R.C., the public interest, or the lawful rights and interests of citizens and
organizations, are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with
law." 40 7 According to the explanatory statement made to the National
People's Congress Standing Committee when the draft law was submitted

402 E.g., Li Wang (HE),
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Development of China'sCivil Procedure in International Cases], Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (+ [
R A KY) [SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA] 123 (2017).
404 See Xiao Yongping (Hlk 7), Chang bi Guanxia Quan de Fali Fenxi Yu Duice Yanjiu ( "
tR" JM 3#ht- 41,TfMf) [A JurisprudentialAnalysis of the "Long-arm Jurisdiction" and
Responses], Zhongguo Faxue (+ [T'') [LEGAL SCIENCE IN CHINA] 39 (2019).
405 Frank Tang, China Urged to Flex Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Protect Its Companies from Foreign
Hostility, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Sept.
17, 2020, 6:00 AM), para. 1,
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for a vote, extraterritorial application was a considered "necessary" in
order to fully protect data security.4 08 Similarly, Article 3 of the newly
enacted Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL 2021) prescribes:
This law is also applicable to activities outside the PRC territory that
process the personal information of natural persons within the territory
of the PRC, in any of the following circumstances:
(1) for the purpose of providing products or services to natural
persons within the territory;
(2) to analyze and evaluate the conduct of natural persons in the
territory;

(3) Other circumstances provided for by laws and administrative
regulations.40 9

The language in both statutes is general and ambiguous, aiming to serve
both ideological function as well as legislative one. It sends a clear enough
message to the Chinese judiciary. Chinese courts may not make any
decision like Equustek immediately, but there is no question that policy is
pointing in that direction.
V. CONCLUSION

In cyberspace, an unprecedented judicial divergence is happening.
In the United States, the global center of the internet and the home of many
major digital platforms, jurisprudence is based on a globalization
characterized by self-regulation, which is in line with American
commercial interests and First Amendment ideology. On the other side,
however, is the courts in Commonwealth countries, the European Union,
and Japan-whose policy is characterized by a public regulation
approach-who are increasingly more assertive in claiming jurisdiction,
applying tort-based standards, and more open to global enforcement
against global digital platforms. Anxious of losing their own competitive
edge, even the very control of their economy and social values in the
digital era, these countries consider "surveillance capitalism" more of an
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American problem that must be addressed by a revolt against the American
regulatory approach. This is also true in the third camp-China. From the
very beginning, China was driven by its own ideology and self-interests,
but it had the same need to assert control of the internet. In cyberspace,
China's regulatory approach has double targets: American platforms as
well as China's homemade surveillance capitalism-China's digital
platforms, which all started as non-state corporations. For this goal, China
borrows ideas and conceptual tools from the second camp in building its
own regulatory apparatus. The result of these developments in both the
second and third camps is a widening judicial divergence that belies an
underlying revolt against US hegemony-the "Brussels' effect" on a
global scale. 41 0
For convergence believers-the generations of American
globalists and comparative lawyers who confidently believe that the
United States is a model for the rest of the world-this is a shocking
development. A global revolt is different from a claim that the American
model is less appealing; 411 it is a claim that judges and lawmakers in all of
America's major trading partners are consciously embracing a different
regulatory approach in response to American refusal to regulate their
digital platforms at home. From the vantage point of 2021, this divergence
may well be a new normal stuck with us for some time. Recently in the
United States, while there are some measures taken on the state level 412 or
on the federal level by the Biden Administration, 413 it is hard to anticipate
in the short term any significant change like that of the EU's proposed bills
such as the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. 414
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This state of regulatory divergence in cyberspace, however, not
only fragments the internet but also cancels out the supposed "benefits" of
self-regulating at-home. This is particularly important as major digital
platforms have more users in foreign markets and derive more revenue
overseas. 415 American policymakers, should they find themselves
increasingly in a political predicament, are not alone. The global digital
platforms are trapped in an awkward situation too, though a slightly
different one. While they are often out of the reach of courts or are
protected by Section 230 immunity at home, they prove to themselves and
the world that they are capable of being more responsive and accountable
to their users in foreign markets when required by local law and enforced
by local courts. Whatever they tell Congress or the general public to justify
the status quo, they know they are acting in bad faith.
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